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 ABSTRACT 
Dissertation Title: Uncovering a Differentiated Theory of Mind in Children with Autism 
and Asperger Syndrome 
Michele Tully Tine 
Dissertation Chair: Joan Lucariello 
 
Metarepresentational Theory of Mind was studied in children with autism and 
Asperger syndrome.  This research challenged the prominent view that Theory of Mind 
(ToM) is a single, integrated cognitive ability, wherein reasoning about the mental states 
of self and others are considered to be one and the same.  The Functional Multilinear 
Socialization Model (Lucariello, 2004) proposes that ToM differentiates into separate 
cognitive abilities based on the target of reasoning.  Social ToM is defined as reasoning 
about others’ mental states.  Intrapersonal ToM is defined reasoning about one’s own 
mental states. The current work aimed to investigate if ToM abilities in children with 
autism and Asperger syndrome differentiate into Social and Intrapersonal ToM.  A 
second aim was to determine if ToM differentiation patterns for children with autism and 
Asperger syndrome were different. 
Participants included 39 children with autism and 34 children with Asperger 
syndrome ages 8-14.   Measures included a language measure, an IQ measure, and a 
battery of ToM tasks.  The ToM tasks assessed Social and Intrapersonal ToM related to 
 distinguishing appearance from reality, representational change, false belief, and 
perspective-taking across the domains of emotions, beliefs, and perceptions.  
Theory of Mind differentiated into Social ToM and Intrapersonal ToM for all 
participants.  Both children with autism and Asperger syndrome obtained lower Social 
ToM scores than Intrapersonal ToM scores.  ToM differentiation patterns for children 
with autism were distinct from children with Asperger syndrome.   The difference 
between Intrapersonal ToM and Social ToM was greater for children with autism than 
children with Asperger syndrome. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by impairments in social 
interaction, poor communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviors (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Children do not outgrow autism and there is no cure.  It 
is a lifelong disability with a normal life expectancy.  In April of 2002, the United States 
Congress declared autism a national epidemic, as the incidence is increasing at an 
alarming rate. Only 10 years ago, it was estimated that autism affected one out of 10,000 
children.  Three years ago, it was estimated that it affected one out of 250 children 
(Autism Research Institute, 2007).  A 2008 Centers for Disease Control report found that 
1 in 150 children in America today suffer from autism, making it more prevalent than 
Down Syndrome, Childhood Diabetes, and Childhood Cancer combined.   
Asperger syndrome is a related pervasive developmental disorder that shares the 
social impairments and restricted and repetitive behaviors characteristic of autism 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  Although prevalence estimates of Asperger 
syndrome vary enormously, conservative estimates suggest that every two out of 10,000 
children are currently affected.  Like autism, the numbers have increased steadily in 
recent years (Fombonne, 2007).  The sharp spike in incidence rates has caused an 
explosion in the amount of research dedicated to these disorders, yet the causes and 
specific cognitive processes that are affected remain undefined.   
In attempts to understand the psychological deficits associated with autism and 
Asperger syndrome, much attention has been give to the hypothesis that they entail a 
disturbance in Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM is the understanding of persons as 




psychological beings. It entails our imputation of mental states to the self and to others to 
account for behavior. For some time, the predominant view has been that ToM is a single 
“integrated” cognitive ability, wherein reasoning about the mental states of self and 
others are considered to be one and the same cognitive skill (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001; German & Leslie, 2000; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Scholl & Leslie, 1999, 2001; 
Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994; Pears & Moses, 2003; Fonagy, Redfern, & Charman, 1997; 
Hughs & Dunn, 1998). 
While the integrated view prevails, recent research with typically developing 
samples suggests that ToM differentiates into separate cognitive abilities.  The Functional 
Multilinear Socialization (FMS) Model (Lucariello, 2004) proposes a differentiated view 
defining separate cognitive abilities related to the target of the reasoning. Social ToM is 
reasoning about others’ mental states and Intrapersonal ToM is reasoning about one’s 
own mental states (Lucariello, 2004).  The differentiated view also holds that these 
separable ToMs may not develop in synchrony ontogenetically.  Previous research with 
typically developing samples supports the FMS Model of ToM.  It provides convincing 
evidence that ToM is a non-integrated cognitive skill that functionally differentiates into 
Social and Intrapersonal types for kindergarten and 3rd grade children (Lucariello, 2006; 
Lucariello, Durand, & Yarnell, 2007; Lucariello & Butler, 2008).  
An extensive body of work has shown that children with autism and Asperger 
syndrome perform significantly worse than typically developing children on ToM tasks 
(Baron-Cohen, 2001).  However, this work has been limited in an important way; it has 
been exclusively conducted under the integrated view of ToM.  Results have been based 




upon measures that generally only tap participant’s ability to reason about other’s mental 
states.  However, investigators have drawn conclusions under the theoretical assumption 
that ToM is an integrated ability and therefore may have incorrectly generalized children 
with autism’s failure to reason about other’s mental states to represent impairment in 
both other and own ToM.  According to the FMS Model (Lucariello, 2004), the inability 
to pass a task assessing the mental states of others would not necessarily represent an 
inability in ToM functioning generally or in Intrapersonal ToM. 
The purpose of the current study was to test the differentiated account of ToM 
with children with autism and Asperger syndrome for the first time.  In turn, a more 
specific cognitive profile of these populations was obtained.  ToM tasks assessing Social 
and Intrapersonal ToM (metarepresentational) reasoning related to distinguishing 
appearance from reality, representational change, false belief, and Level 2 perspective 
taking across the domains of emotions, beliefs, and perceptions were administered to 
participants with autism and Asperger syndrome.  The Social ToM tasks tapped 
reasoning about others’ mental states.  The Intrapersonal ToM tasks tapped reasoning 
about one’s own mental states.  A within subject design was employed such that each 
participant received all tasks. Performance across Social and Intrapersonal tasks was 
compared.  
It was hypothesized that ToM would differentiate.  Specifically, it was 
hypothesized that children with autism and Asperger syndrome would exhibit more 
severe Social ToM impairments than Intrapersonal ToM impairments, as the 
differentiated view of ToM rests on a functional analysis. Social Reasoning is critically 




important in social interactions and Intrapersonal Reasoning is used in learning and 
reflection.  The hypothesis of the current study considered the diagnostic criteria of 
autism and Asperger syndrome, which include delay in social, but not necessarily 
intellectual (intrapersonal) forms of reasoning.  In addition, it took into account the 
established weakness that these children show on ToM tasks that measure 
comprehending and predicting the mental states of others.  Accordingly, it was 
hypothesized that participants may perform lower on Social ToM than Intrapersonal ToM 
measures. 
Moreover, it was hypothesized that this Social ToM deficit would be even more 
severe in children with autism than children with Asperger syndrome.  This hypothesis 
reflected the fact that the social impairments seen in autism are more severe and frequent 
than those seen in Asperger syndrome. 
 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
AUTISM 
Autism, originally described by Kanner in 1943, is among the most severe of all 
neurodevelopmental disorders.  Epidemiological studies indicate a lifetime prevalence of 
autistic disorder for 1 in 150 individuals (Center for Disease Control, 2008).  Recent 
reports of the rising incidence of autism have generated considerable support for 
increased research into the causes, manifestations, and treatment.  The Child Health Act 
of 2000 was the first U.S. governmental initiative to specifically address the need for 
comprehensive research to elucidate the presumably complex causes and nature of the 
disorder, thereby aiding diagnoses, detection, prevention, prognostic accuracy, and 
treatment. 
Autism is a pervasive disorder associated with substantial deficits in reciprocal 
social interaction and communication, and the presence of repetitive and stereotyped 
behaviors and unusual interests.  Currently, the following criteria are applied for the 
diagnosis of autistic disorder, according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM 
IV-R) of the American Psychiatric Association.  These three classic features of autism 
typically appear in infancy and are, by definition, always present by the age of 3 years. 
1. Social interaction impairment.  There must be a qualitative impairment 
in reciprocal social interaction, relative to developmental level.  There is 
a lack of personal relationships with others.  Behavioral signs include 
poor use of eye gaze and of gestures.   




2. Communication Deficits.  There must be qualitative impairment in 
verbal and nonverbal communication, relative to developmental level.  
Behavioral signs include delay in the acquisition of language, or lack of 
speech. 
3. Restricted and repetitive behaviors.  There must be a markedly 
restricted repertoire of activities and interest, appropriate to 
developmental level.  Behavioral signs include repetitive or stereotyped 
movements, such as hand flapping and interests that are abnormally 
intense or abnormally narrow. 
The following section will describe the core dimensions of autism in more detail 
in an attempt to provide a thorough understanding of the disorder. 
Social Interaction Impairment 
 Often the social impairments are the first observable and identifiable autistic 
impairments.  Social deficits are present in all individuals with autism spectrum disorders 
and indicate that problems of social interaction can begin very early.  Even before one 
year, some infants with autism are less likely than control infants to be visually 
responsive and more likely to show aversion to being touched by another person 
(Baranek, 1999; Werner et al., 2000).  Older infants fail to track people visually, avoid 
eye contact, exhibit an “empty” gaze, fail to respond to others with emotional expression 
and positive affect, and show little interest in being held (Adrien et al, 1993; Stone, 
1997).   




 During childhood, a variety of social deficits, such as lack of understanding of 
social cues and inappropriate social actions, are also evident.  There is a certain 
aloofness, disinterest, and lack of social reciprocity. Children with autism fail to develop 
relationships with their peers to the extent appropriate to their developmental level.  The 
child may ignore others, fail to engage in cooperative play, or seem overly content to be 
alone (Volkmar et al., 1997).   
Communication Deficits 
 Disturbed communication- both verbal and non-verbal- is a second aspect of the 
triad of difficulties in autism.  Humans typically “speak” to each other nonverbally by 
gesture, posture, and facial expression; however, in children with autism, nonverbal 
communication is atypical or deficient.  For example, difficulties exist in understanding 
social and emotional stimuli, such as the emotional expressions on the faces of other 
people.  Deficits in joint attention interactions are also striking.  These interactions  
involve gestures, such as pointing and eye contact that center the child’s and caregiver’s 
attention on an object in order to share an experience.  In addition, when youth with 
autism do use simple instrumental gestures, complex gestures that express feelings may 
be lacking, even into adolescence (Attwood et al., 1988).  The absence of these gestures 
can be considered a social interaction deficit, as well. 
 Both comprehension and expression of spoken language are also problematic.  
The comprehension of language sometimes has been found to be delayed compared with 
that of children with specific language disorders (Lord & Paul, 1997).  About 50 percent 
of children with autism remain mute or rarely say more than individual words or simple 




phrases.  Babbling and verbalizations may be abnormal in tone, pitch, and rhythm, and 
these deficits may persist into adolescence and adulthood (Sheinkopf et al., 2000; Tager-
Flusberg, 1993).  In those who acquire language, development is delayed and often 
abnormal (Lord & Paul, 1997).  
Speech is often excessively literal and echolalias and pronoun reversals are 
common. In echolalia the person echoes back what another has said.  Why echolalia 
occurs in autism is not yet known.  Confusion about the use of pronouns is more common 
in autism than in other disorders or normal development.  A child may refer to others as 
‘I’ or ‘me’, and to the self as ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘them’, or ‘you’.   Pronoun reversal may stem 
from echolalia (for example, an adult says “You can eat a cookie,” and the child then 
echoes this statement).  However, it has been argued that it is likely that there is a more 
general deficit, perhaps failure to understand that different people have different 
perspectives or that language requires different forms to refer to different persons (Lord 
& Paul, 1997; Oshima-Takana & Benaroyam 1989; Tager-Flusberg, 1993). 
When speech does occur, the most notable impairment concerns pragmatics, the 
social use of language (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Klinger & Dawson, 1996).  In severe cases, 
language is mostly simple statements, requests, and commands.  In other cases, 
conversations are characterized by irrelevant details and inappropriate shifts in topic.  
There may also be an overall failure to develop conversation.  Nevertheless, some 
children do function at a higher level.  They may be able to tell stories and may 
communicate more effectively when given prompts or models of conversation (Loveland 
& Tunali-Kotoski, 1997).  Some are able to read; in fact, they may decode words at 




above average levels, although comprehension is typically below normal (Lord & Paul, 
1997). 
Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors 
 The third major impairment in autism is atypical and often odd behaviors that are 
described as restricted, repetitive, stereotyped, obsessive, or rigid behaviors and interests.  
Stereotyped motor behaviors commonly reported by parents include rocking, walking on 
toes, whirling, and arm or finger flapping (Klinger & Dawson, 1996).  Although many of 
these oddities are seen in typically developing children and select behavioral disorders, 
they occur in autism more frequently and with greater severity (Bodfish et. al., 2000; 
Turner, 1999). 
 Also particularly characteristic of autism are repetitive, obsessive activities and 
interest.  These include unusual preoccupations with aspects of the environment.  
Children may seem obsessed with a toy, a telephone, or numbers.  They may collect 
objects and seem to place undue value on them.  In addition, play behavior may be rigid 
and lacking in social imitation and imagination.  Children with autism often do not 
pretend when they play, nor use symbols themselves (Baron-Cohen, 1993).  They may 
simply repeat behaviors over and over, such as lining up items.  They may also be overly 
absorbed in hobbies, and they may adopt routines and rituals that must be followed, such 
as eating and going to bed.  Minor changes in the environment, such as rearrangement of 
furniture or schedules, can cause much upset, a reaction seldom reported in non-autistic 
groups (Turner, 1999). 
General Neural Abnormalities 




Research from the past few decades has uncovered multiple neural abnormalities 
associated with the behavioral symptoms which characterize autism in the amygdala 
(Baron-Cohen et al, 2000), paracingulate cortex  (Flethcer et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 
2000; Vogeley at al., 2001; Brunet et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2000), and superior 
temporal sulcus (Casteli et al., 2000).  Studies also find reduced gray matter volume in 
anatomical MRI scans in this population (McAlonan et al., 2004) and abnormal activation 
in the fusiform gyrus (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Clark et al., 1996; Haxby et al., 1994; 
Kanwisher, 1999; and Puce et al., 1995; Hubl et al., 2003; Pierce et al., 2001; Schultz et 
al., 2000) and cerebellum (Gursh, 2004; Ito, 1984; Wolpert, Zoubin, & Flanagan, 2001; 
see Decety, 1996 for a review).   One of the more consistent findings about the autistic 
brain is that it is larger and heavier than the normal brain.  However, this increased size is 
not evident from birth, but from ages 2-4 (Courchesne et al., 2001).  The aforementioned 
regions are certainly not an exhaustive list of the neural abnormalities in autism.  Yet, 
when one considers these regions, it is clear that autism is a complex neurological 
disorder.  The affected regions span the entire brain from anterior to posterior, cortical to 
subcortical, and motor to perceptual to cognitive systems, making a unifying link difficult 
to conceive.  
ASPERGER SYNDROME 
Asperger syndrome is also a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by 
deficits in social interaction and unusual or restricted patterns of interest or behavior.  
However, unlike autism, the DSM-IV-R diagnosis of Asperger syndrome requires no 




clinically significant delay in language acquisition and cognitive development (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000).   
Social Interaction Impairment 
Clinically, the distinction between autism and Asperger syndrome is often made 
in terms of severity and qualitative expression of the social criteria.  In Asperger 
syndrome there are generally fewer social impairment symptoms than in autism, as well 
as a distinct presentation (Fitzgerald & Corvin, 2001). While individuals with autism are 
apt to be withdrawn and may seem disinterested in relating to others, individuals with 
Asperger’s are aware of other people and desire friendship.  They are often 
(involuntarily) socially isolated because their approaches tend to be inappropriate and 
peculiar.  Individuals with Asperger syndrome are unable to execute knowledge about 
another person’s intentions and emotions in a spontaneous and useful manner.  The lack 
of spontaneous adaptation is associated with an over-reliance on formalistic rules of 
behavior (Klin & Volkmar, 1995; McPartland & Klin, 2006). 
Communication Deficits 
 Although severe deficits in communication would lead to a diagnosis of autism 
instead of Asperger syndrome, several unique qualitative aspects of communication in 
Asperger syndrome have been identified.  First, speech is often marked by poor prosody.  
Inflection and intonation typically are not as rigid and monotone as in autism.  A 
restricted range of intonation patterns may result in utterances in which one’s tone of 
voice is inconsistent or unrelated to content and communicative intent.   Second, speech 
may also seem tangential and circumstantial.  A third characteristic of communication 




among individuals with Asperger syndrome is verbosity (McPartland & Klin, 2006).  An 
individual with Asperger syndrome may launch into monologues on their favorite topic 
with complete disregard of the listener’s interest, nonverbal signals, or background 
information (Kasari & Rotheram-Fuller, 2005). 
Restricted and Repetitive Behaviors 
 Restricted and repetitive behaviors are much less commonly reported in Asperger 
syndrome than autism.  The exception is a preoccupation with an unusual topic about 
which an individual with Asperger syndrome amasses considerable factual knowledge.  
Given the deficits in the pragmatics of social interaction, individuals with Asperger 
syndrome tend to readily share this information, at great length and in considerable detail.  
The area of special interest may dominate the social interactions and activities of an 
individual with Asperger syndrome (South, Ozonoff & McMahon, 2005).  
Gross and fine motor problems are often seen in association with Asperger 
syndrome but are not part of the required criteria for diagnosis.   Motor milestones may 
be delayed, but more typically, there are delays in the acquisition of more complex motor 
skills such as riding a bike, catching a ball, and climbing.  Individuals with Asperger 
syndrome often display an odd gait, poor manipulative skills, and deficits in visual-motor 
coordination.  In autism, however, gross motor skills are often a relative strength 
(McPartland & Klin, 2006). 
General Neural Abnormalities 
The neurobiological determinants of Asperger syndrome are poorly understood.  
One of a very few studies investigated grey matter differences between a group of adults 




with Asperger’s and matched controls. They noted grey matter anomalies in the 
cerebellum, medial temporal, and frontal lobe structures (Abell et al.,1999). These 
findings fit broadly with a growing consensus that limbic system and cerebellar 
abnormalities may be important determinants of autism.  McAlonan and colleagues 
(2002) found that people with Asperger syndrome had significant reductions in grey 
matter volume of frontostriatal and cerebellar regions. In addition, people with Asperger 
syndrome had white matter excesses bilaterally around the basal ganglia, whereas they 
had deficits mainly in left hemisphere. This finding of reduced grey matter in the medial 
frontal lobe of people with Asperger syndrome is also in agreement with other 
neuroanatomical studies of autism (Haznedar et al., 1997; Abell et al., 1999). 
THEORY OF MIND 
The aforementioned sections review the defining features of autism and Asperger 
syndrome, highlight the behaviors that are quite readily identified by parents, teachers, 
and others interacting with these individuals and by standardized tests.  Recent work has 
given a more complete and subtle picture of some of the psychological deficits involved.  
Investigators have asked whether specific cognitive impairments may underlie and 
account for the wide range of symptoms seen in autism and Asperger syndrome.  
Specifically, much attention has been given to the hypothesis that autism and Asperger 
syndrome entail a disturbance in the understanding of persons as psychological beings, 
also known as Theory of Mind.  Admittedly, Theory of Mind deficits are not the only 
cognitive feature of these disorders.  Other impairments include weak central coherence 
(Frith, 1989), executive dysfunction (Russell, 1997), affective processing (Hobson, 




1989), and imitation (Rogers and Pennington, 1991).  However, evidence suggests that 
Theory of Mind seems to be a core and possibly universal abnormality among these 
populations. 
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the understanding of persons as psychological beings.  
It entails our imputation of mental states to the self and to others to account for behavior.  
It is one of our most important cognitive abilities, as it is one of the few quintessential 
abilities that make us human.  Understandably, its study has dominated the field of 
cognitive psychology for more than two decades.  A milestone in ToM development is 
the attainment of metarepresentational reasoning at 4–5 years of age.  
Metarepresentational reasoning underlies the ability to distinguish mental states from 
reality.  It allows us to simultaneously maintain the contrasting representations of an 
object as it in reality versus as it appears to be or versus another's conception of it.   This 
reasoning is evident in behaviors such as 1) false belief, or knowing another’s erroneous 
belief with respect to reality, 2) distinguishing appearance from reality, or knowing both 
an object’s/person’s appearance and reality when these differ, and 3) representational 
change, or knowing one’s own past false belief with respect to reality.  Various tasks are 
used to measure these behaviors, as outlined below. 
Unexpected location tasks are often used to assess false belief.  For example, in 
the “Maxi” story, first used by Wimmer and Perner (1983), a child sees a doll Maxi put a 
candy bar into a green cabinet.  Maxi walks out of the room and while Maxi is no longer 
in the room, Maxi’s mother moves the candy bar from the green cabinet to a white 
cabinet.  Finally, Maxi comes back into the room to find his candy bar.  The child is 




asked where Maxi will look for the candy bar.  A child without false belief understanding 
will respond that Maxi will look in the white cabinet, which is where the candy bar 
actually is.  They make their predictions based on what they know to be true.  However, 
children who do understand Maxi’s false belief will correctly predict that Maxi will first 
look in the green cabinet for his candy bar.   
The “Sally-Anne” task is another version of the unexpected location task used to 
assess false belief and has been well used with children with autism and Asperger 
syndrome.  The experimenter uses two dolls, Sally and Anne.  Sally has a basket.  Anne 
has a box. Experimenters show participants a scenario, in which Sally puts a marble in 
her basket and then leaves the scene. While Sally is away and cannot watch, Anne takes 
the marble out of Sally's basket and puts it into her box. Sally then returns and the child is 
asked where they think she will look for her marble.   
Unexpected identity tasks are used to measure distinguishing appearance from 
reality, representational change, and false belief.  In unexpected identity tasks, a child is 
presented with a deceptive object (e.g., a sponge that looks like a rock.)  The child 
initially thinks the object is one thing based on its appearance (e.g., a rock).  Then, they 
are given the opportunity to explore the object (e.g., touch it) and become aware that it is 
really a sponge, even though it appears to be a rock.   To measure distinguishing 
appearance from reality, the child is asked what the object looks like and what it really is.  
False belief is assessed by asking the child what a child who hasn’t explored the object 
will think it is.  Representational change is assessed by asking the child what they thought 
the object was before they explored it (e.g., a rock).    




An unexpected contents task can also be used to measure false belief, 
distinguishing appearance from reality, and representational change.  For example, 
experimenters ask children what they believe to be the contents of a box that looks as 
though it holds a candy called Smarties. After the child guesses Smarties, they are shown 
that the box in fact contains pencils.  Representational change is measured by asking the 
child what they thought the contents of the box were before they opened it.  To assess 
false belief, the experimenter then re-closes the box and asks the child what they think 
another person, who has not been shown the true contents, will think is inside the box.  
Distinguishing appearance from reality is measured by asking the child what it looks like 
is in the box and what is really in the box.  
A foundational question about ToM is whether it is a single unitary construct or 
differentiates into separable abilities. For some time, the predominant view has been that 
ToM is a single unitary construct.  Under this “integrated” view, reasoning about the 
mental states of self of and others are deemed to be one and the same cognitive ability 
(Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Wellman, Watson, & Cross, 
2001).   These integrated accounts include Theory of Mind Mechanism/Selection 
Processing, Theory-Theory, Sociocultural Based ToM, and Language Based ToM.   In 
contrast, the “differentiated” view suggests that ToM differentiates into separate 
cognitive abilities related to the target of the reasoning and includes the Simulation 
account (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Harris, 1992) and the Functional Multilinear 
Socialization Model (Lucariello, 2004).  These integrated and differentiated accounts are 
outlined below. 




Integrated Theory of Mind Accounts 
Theory-of-Mind Mechanism/Selection Processing 
Theory of Mind Mechanism/Selection Processing hypothesizes that ToM is a 
unitary construct with an innate basis (German & Leslie, 2000; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; 
Scholl & Leslie, 1999, 2001).  According to this hypothesis, ToM originates from a 
module that spontaneously processes information about attended actions, treats the 
actions as intentional, and automatically computes the mental states attributable to the 
actions.  The logic of the argument is based on the assumption that the disorder of autism 
is the result of a biological disorder, rather than the result of some particular 
experience(s).  ToM is specifically and uniquely affected in autism, therefore these 
theorists attest there must be a biological, brain basis for ToM in the form of a module.   
Theory-Theory 
Theory-theory proposes that one’s ordinary understanding of the mind proceeds 
by the formation, revision, and replacement of successive theories of the mind.  Rather 
than being determined by some innate maturational schedule, this succession of theories 
is the result of the operation of more general inferential mechanisms (Gopnick, 1993;  
Gopnick & Wellman, 1994; Perner, 1991).  Like scientists, children understand the world 
by constructing coherent views of it and change those views in light of new evidence that 
they obtain.  Children play an active role in this process by making predictions, seeking 
explanations, and considering evidence that is relevant to the mind.  Moreover, theories 
in one domain can influence theories in other domains.  The information encoded in 
theories, unlike that encoded in modules, can be influenced by other types of knowledge.  




In other words, there is conceptual change during development.  In fact, a consistent 
developmental progression of ToM understanding across various countries and task 
manipulations has been shown with meta-analytic data.  Wellman and colleagues (2001) 
argue that developmental changes in ToM understanding are a reflection of genuine 
conceptual change that occurs during the preschool years.  However, the Theory-Theory 
account does not distinguish between the mental states of self and other during this 
conceptual change.  In fact, ToM development is described by Wellman as “an 
interrelated body of knowledge, based on core mental-state constructs such as ‘beliefs’ 
and ‘desires,’ that apply to all persons generically, that is, to both self and others” 
(Wellman et al., 2001, p. 678).   
Sociocultural account 
The sociocultural account of theory of mind proposes that social contextual 
variables act as the underlying source of ToM development.  These variables include the 
presence of siblings (Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Jenkins & 
Astington, 1996; Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994), social interactions with friends 
with whom they frequently refer to mental states (Brown, Donelan-McCall, & Dunn, 
1996; Hughs & Dunn, 1998), parenting styles (Pears & Moses, 2003; Ruffman, Perner, & 
Parkin, 1999), secure maternal attachment (Fonagy, Redfern, & Charman, 1997; Meins, 
Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998), and conversational experience (Peterson & 
Siegal, 1999; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). 
Language-based account 




Without doubt, there is a relation between language and theory of mind.  This 
relationship has been demonstrated in typically developing children (e.g., Milligan, 
Astington, & Dack, 2007; Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Jenkins & 
Astington, 1996; Ruffman, Slade, Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003), children 
with autism  (Happe, 1995; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005), children with specific 
language impairment (Miller, 2001), and deaf children (de Villiers, 2005; Peterson & 
Siegal, 1999; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). Many researchers argue that language 
plays a causal role in the development of false-belief understanding (e.g., de Villiers, 
2005; Harris, 2005; Nelson, 2005).  Data from longitudinal studies (Astington & Jenkins, 
1999; J. de Villiers & Pyers, 2002) and training studies (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; 
Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003) supports this argument. 
However, language is a complex, multifaceted system. Therefore, it is important 
to determine if all or particular aspects of the linguistic system are involved in theory of 
mind.  For example, semantic ability consists of lexical knowledge/receptive vocabulary 
(word knowledge).  Syntactic ability involves mastering the grammatical structure of a 
language.  Sentential complements are a specific syntactic structure.  A sentential 
complement is a tensed subordinate clause that is embedded under a mental or 
communication verb to form a complex sentence.  For example, in the sentence: Jane 
thinks [that] the chocolate is in the cupboard, the complement is italicized (the specific 
complementizer ‘‘that’’ is optional). This syntactic structure is thought to provide the 
format needed to represent false beliefs.  It allows for a true report of a mistaken 




representation. The overall complex sentence can be true even though the embedded 
clause expresses a proposition that is false. 
Studies examining the roles of syntax and semantics on theory of mind have 
produced inconsistent results. Astington and Jenkins (1999) found that syntax but not 
semantics predicted unique variance in false-belief task scores. In contrast, Ruffman et al. 
(2003), used different measures and reported the converse finding, that is, semantics but 
not syntax predicted unique variance in false-belief task scores.  Similarly, reports of 
general language ability and the ability to understand sentential complements conflict. 
For example, de Villiers & Pyers (2002) found that memory for complements made a 
unique contribution to false-belief understanding beyond that of more general language 
measures.  Yet, Cheung et al. (2004) found that it did not. 
Pragmatic ability, the appropriate use and interpretation of language in discourse 
exchanges, has also been found to play a role on theory of mind abilities.  Correlational 
studies conducted by Peterson and Siegal (1999, 2000) support the hypothesis that 
pragmatics are related to ToM performance.  In these studies, deaf children who had the 
opportunity to engage in richer discourse interactions with others were also more skillful 
in false belief tasks.  Appleton and Reddy’s (1996) training study employed rich 
discourse interactions as part of the training, suggesting that rich discourse is in part 
responsible for ToM improvements.   Similarly, Lohmann and Tomasello’s (2003) 
training study supports the effect of pragmatics on ToM abilities.   Four training 
conditions were used. The first involved perspective-shifting discourse about deceptive 
objects.  The second involved the use of mental state terms and associated sentential 




complement syntax. The third “full” training condition involved both perspective taking 
discourse about deceptive objects and the use of sentential complement syntax.  The 
fourth “no language” training condition combined exposure to deceptive objects with the 
use of only a few attention-directing words (e.g., “look”).   Significant improvements in 
false belief performance were found in all conditions, except the “no language” 
condition.  Moreover, the greatest improvements were found in the “full” condition, 
suggesting perspective-shifting discourse (pragmatics) and experience with sentential 
complement syntax play important independent roles in ToM development. 
In an attempt to make sense of the sometimes conflicting literature, Milligan and 
colleagues (2007) performed a meta-analysis of 104 studies related to language ability 
and false belief.  Five different aspects of language were examined: general language, 
semantics, receptive vocabulary, syntax, and memory for complements.  Results showed 
that there is a significant relationship between false belief performance and each of these 
five types of language ability.  Receptive vocabulary accounted for 12% of the variance 
in false-belief understanding, semantics for 23%, general language for 27%, syntax for 
29%, and memory for complements for 44%.  Clearly, language and theory of mind 
abilities are related.  Yet, if and how the relationship between these aspects of language 
differs between self and other reasoning has not been assessed.  
Differentiated Theory of Mind Accounts 
Simulation 
Another account of ToM speculates that children and adults attribute mental states 
to actions through a simulation process, as opposed to through theoretical constructs, like 




beliefs and desires (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Harris, 1992).  The simulation account 
holds that we represent the mental activities and processes of others by mentally 
simulating them, or generating similar activities and processes in ourselves.  For 
example, children take another person’s visual target or emotional stance and feed it into 
their own perceptual and/or emotional system.   In this simulation account, ToM 
development simply follows age-related improvements in children’s simulation abilities.    
Simulation is distinct from the aforementioned integrated theories of ToM in that 
it does differentiate between reasoning about self and other representations.   According 
to the simulation account, a person initially has more accurate and advanced reasoning 
about their own, compared to other’s mental states.  They are able to use these more 
advanced self reasoning skills as a map on which to simulate other’s reasoning.  In other 
words, simulation assigns primacy to reasoning about one’s own representations.   This 
account can only for uneven ToM development in the direction of better Intrapersonal 
than Social ToM functioning. 
Functional Multilinear Socialization Model 
The Functional Multilinear Socialization (FMS) Model also refutes the integrated 
view in favor of a differentiated view based on a functional analysis of ToM (Lucariello, 
2004).  Unlike the integrated view of ToM, the FMS Model distinguishes reasoning about 
one’s own and others’ mental states as distinct cognitive abilities.  This differentiated 
model poses that theory of mind capabilities differentiate into Social Reasoning 
(reasoning about others’ mental states) and Intrapersonal Reasoning (reasoning about 
one’s own mental states).  Moreover, the FMS Model defines Social Reasoning and 




Intrapersonal Reasoning in relation to the everyday functions they each play.  While other 
researchers have discussed how ToM is a prerequisite for social interaction, they have 
overlooked its other major functions and uses.  The differentiated FMS Model views the 
Social Reasoning component of ToM as critically important in social interactions; one 
must be able to understand and predict the mental states of other people to carry out 
successful social interaction.  In addition, the FMS model is able to capture other distinct 
Intrapersonal uses of ToM, including reflection and learning.    
Support for the Functional Multilinear Socialization Model 
 Typically Developing Population. If we turn again to the behaviors and tasks 
currently used to measure ToM described earlier, they measure either Social or 
Intrapersonal ToM.  False belief (whether it be assessed in an unexpected location, 
identity, or contents task) assesses Social ToM, reasoning about someone else’s mental 
states.  Distinguishing appearance from reality and representational change (be they 
assessed in an unexpected identity or contents task) assess Intrapersonal ToM, reasoning 
about one’s own mental states.  Researchers working within an integrated theoretical 
framework would claim that responses across false belief, appearance-reality, and 
representational change tasks measure the same cognitive ability.  Those coming from a 
nonintegrated view, such as the FMS Model (Lucariello, 2004), would claim these tasks 
tap two distinct cognitive abilities, Social and Intrapersonal ToM respectively. 
Indeed, previous research with typically developing populations supports the 
differentiated FMS Model (Lucariello, 2004) and elucidates that ToM capabilities do in 
fact differentiate into Social and Intrapersonal constructs. For example, performance 




across false belief and appearance-reality tasks is not correlated (Meins, Fernyhough, 
Wainwright, Gupta, Fradley, & Tuckey, 2002).  Similarly, Moore and colleagues (1998) 
found performance across false belief and representational change (or ‘own’ belief) not to 
be correlated.   Ruffman and colleague’s (1998) results also support a differentiated 
Theory of Mind model; the majority of their 5 year olds passed an ‘other’ false belief 
task, but failed a source task (that assesses a child’s understanding of the source of their 
own representations.)  Cutting and Dunn (1999) presented participants with 8 false belief 
tasks, one of which was designed to be a “recall your own” false belief.  This ‘own’ task 
was the only task of the eight not correlated with the others.    
Moreover, studies designed to specifically test the FMS Model (Lucariello, 2004) 
have supported differentiated ToM.  In 2004, Lucariello found that performance across 
social and intrapersonal tasks was not correlated in a sample of low-income 5-6 year olds.  
Specifically, the low-income children were the most successful on the social false belief 
task.  They performed better on the false belief task than the representational change task, 
on which they performed poorly.  Hence, an uneven development across reasoning about 
own and others’ representations was found with greater strength in Social ToM.   
Lucariello, Durand, and Yarnell (2007) also showed that ToM performance differentiated 
and was better in the social than intrapersonal condition with low- and middle-SES 
kindergarten students. Performance in the social condition was strong, with a nearly 67% 
correct response rate. Moreover, there were no SES or sex differences, suggesting that 
the finding is generalizable. Also pointing to differentiated ToM was the fact that 
condition made a unique contribution to ToM performance, beyond the contribution 




made by language.  In addition, Butler and Lucariello (2006) found evidence of uneven 
development of Social and Intrapersonal ToM in gifted children.  Interestingly, gifted 
children performed significantly better on intrapersonal tasks than social tasks.   The fact 
that differences on the social and intrapersonal tasks exist and show asymmetric 
development in either direction certainly provides evidence that ToM is composed of the 
distinct abilities of social and intrapersonal reasoning.     
Admittedly, Wellman, Cross, and Watson’s (2001) meta analysis suggests that 
there are no differences between own and other reasoning tasks.  However, this analysis 
was run only on own and other reasoning within a false belief task paradigm.  Many other 
tasks can be used to measure one’s own reasoning such as appearance reality, source, and 
emotion vignette tasks (Ruffman et. al, 1998; Hughes & Dunn, 1998).  Is seems possible 
that own and other reasoning do not differentiate within the constraints of a false belief 
task, but do so on other assessments (as supported by the more recent aforementioned 
studies that were not included in the meta-analysis).  In addition, the large majority of 
studies reviewed were conducted with homogeneous, typically developing, middle 
income samples.  It seems conceivable that a cognitive profile showing an equivalent 
ability to understand one’s own and other mental states may be unique to this group and 
may reflect synchronous development of two distinct cognitive abilities. 
Taken together, the studies cited above provide evidence of a differentiated ToM.  
The integrated Theory-Theory, Theory-of-Mind Mechanism/Selection Processing, 
Socialization, and Language Based accounts of ToM cannot account for these data.  
Moreover, the differentiated Simulation account of ToM cannot account for these data, as 




it assigns primacy only to self-reasoning.  Yet, there is considerable evidence that 
children (e.g., middle- and low-income) show uneven ToM development in the direction 
of stronger Social than Intrapersonal ToM. 
Neuroscientific Support for FMS Model in Typically Developing Children 
Recent neuroscientific data also suggests that ToM may differentiate in typically 
developing children. Positron emission tomography (PET) data show activation in 
different regions of brain for self perspective versus third person (other) perspective.  
Ruby & Decety (2003) conducted a PET study where subjects were asked to respond to a 
list of health-related questions, taking either their own perspective or the perspective of a 
'lay person'.  Third-person perspective as compared to self perspective was associated 
with activation in the medial part of the superior frontal gyrus, left superior temporal 
sulcus, left temporal pole, and right inferior parietal lobe. Yet, the reverse comparison 
revealed a specific activation in the postcentral gyrus for the first-person conceptual 
perspective.  
In a second PET study, participants were asked to adopt either their own 
perspective or a third person perspective of their mothers in response to situations 
involving social emotions or to neutral situations. The main effect of third-person versus 
first-person perspective resulted in hemodynamic increase in the medial part of the 
superior frontal gyrus, left superior temporal sulcus, left temporal pole, posterior cingulate 
gyrus, and right inferior parietal lobe. However, a cluster in the postcentral gyrus was 
detected in the reverse comparison (Ruby & Decety, 2004). These two studies support the 




idea of a differentiated theory of mind in that different areas of the brain are activated 
when processing self and other perspectives. 
However, the recent discovery of mirror neurons in macaque monkeys by 
Rizzolatti and colleagues has been used to support an integrated ToM.  Using single unity 
electrophysiology, Rizzolatti and colleagues discovered that a portion of neurons in area 
F5 of the macaque premotor cortex responded not only when the monkey performed an 
action, but also when the monkey watched the researcher perform a similar action 
(DiPellegrino et al., 1992). The team named this system the “mirror neuron system”, as it 
seemed that the observed action was “mirrored” or simulated within the monkey’s own 
motor system.  More recently, successful attempts have been made to localize a human 
mirror neuron system (MNS) and investigate its specific properties (Fadiga et. a1.,1995;  
Buccino et al., 2001; Grezes, 2003; Buccino et al., 2004; Stevens et al., 2000; 
DiPellegrino and colleagues, 1992). 
Of interest to the current study, mirror-like systems in the medial prefrontal cortex 
(Brodmann’s Area 9) may be involved in our ability to infer internal mental states of 
others. Though not traditionally thought of as part of the MNS, this area responds both 
when participants are asked to make judgments regarding their own abilities, personality 
traits, and attitudes (Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002) and when asked to attribute 
intentions to characters in a comic strip (Brunet et al., 2000) or infer another person’s 
knowledge about a familiar or unfamiliar object (Goel, 1995).  Moreover, a study that 
asked participants to evaluate their own emotional responses to a picture and to infer the 
mental state of the individual in the picture (Ochsner et al., 2004) found that the medial 




prefrontal cortex responded during both conditions. Thus, it has been suggested that it is 
conceivable that the same region of the brain that is involved in representing our own 
mental states is also involved in inferring mental states of others.    
In three fMRI studies (Wicker et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2004; Morrison et al., 
2004), empathy for specific emotions activated similar networks of cerebral cortex as the 
actual experience of that emotion. Both the experience of disgust (while inhaling foul 
smelling odorants) and the observation of others performing facial expressions of disgust 
activates the same regions of the insula and the anterior cingulate cortex (Wicker et al., 
2003). Additionally, both the experience of a physically painful stimulus and the 
knowledge that a loved one is experiencing the same painful stimulus activates the 
anterior insula and rostral anterior cingulate cortex bilaterally (Singer et al., 2004). These 
areas were also correlated with individual empathy scores, indicating that the more 
activity produced in these regions, the better the individual’s ability to empathize with 
others. Similarly, another study found that receiving a painful pin-prick and watching a 
stranger receive the same pin-prick activated dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (Morrison et 
al., 2004). 
 Admittedly, the aforementioned MNS evidence suggests that mentalizing about 
the self and others activates similar areas of the brain.  However, it is naive to assume 
that simply because two abilities use resources from similar brain regions that they are 
the same cognitive function.  For example, it is well known that the hypothalamus is 
involved in emotion as well as thirst, the amygdala in memory as well as fear, the 
hippocampus in memory as well as some learning, while the thalamus regulates sleep and 




wakefulness as well as auditory, somatic, visceral, gustatory and visual systems.  It is 
important to keep in mind that even though some MNS research may suggest that 
mentalizing about self and other may utilize similar brain regions, that does not 
necessarily define them as the same cognitive process.   Moreover, the aforementioned 
PET research suggests that thinking about one’s own perspective is in fact distinct from 
thinking about another’s perspective. 
Autistic Population  If ToM does differentiate, we might also expect to see such 
in autism.   However, the immense amount of research regarding theory of mind 
capabilities in the autistic population has yet to acknowledge, let alone test this 
possibility.  Thus far, research on this population has been conducted primarily under the 
assumption that reasoning about the self and other are one and the same cognitive ability.  
Yet, in actuality, the collective studies are primarily based on measures that tap the 
reasoning of others.  Findings that suggest poor reasoning about others have been 
generalized to suggest poor reasoning about self and other. The body of work that 
establishes ToM deficits with respect to metarepresentational reasoning in children with 
autism is outlined below, highlighting the almost exclusive focus on reasoning about 
others mental states. 
False Belief.   The vast majority of studies investigating ToM in children with 
autism focus on false belief.   Table 1 lists these studies.  In the 1980s it was discovered 
that children with autism fail to understand another person’s false beliefs about the world 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  In the initial study, 20 children with autism with a 
mental age well over four years were tested on the Sally-Anne false belief task.  Eighty 




percent of these children failed to comprehend the character’s false belief.  In contrast, 
86% of Down Syndrome children of a lower mental age succeeded on the task.  This 
paradigm has since been used in numerous studies, with a number of variations.  Almost 
all studies have replicated the finding that a large majority of subjects with autism fail 
false belief understanding -or- mentalizing about other’s beliefs.  However, none of the 
tasks directly assess and/or compare the children’s reasoning of their own beliefs and 




Studies documenting poor performance on false-belief tasks by participants with autism 
 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985 Most autistic subjects fail first order false 
belief task (Sally-Anne) 
Dawson & Fernald, 1987 Autistic subjects are impaired in 
“conceptual perspective taking” cannot 
choose gifts appropriate for different 
people 
Harris & Muncer, 1988 Autistic subjects find false desires as 
difficult as false beliefs 
Baron-Cohen, 1989a 
 
Even those autistic subjects who pass 
first-order false belief tasks fail a 
second-order false belief task 
Baron-Cohen, 1989b 
 
Autistic subjects fail appearance 
vs. reality task 
Oswald & Ollendick, 1989 Autistic subjects not significantly 
worse than MH controls on picture 
sequencing or Sally-Ann tasks but 
worse on a "hide the penny" game 




Autistic subjects fail "Smarties" test of 
false belief, cannot infer knowledge 
from perceptual access, and fail to 
communicate preferentially information 
unknown to hearer. Controls 
were specific-language-impaired children 
Nunez & Riviere, 1990 Autistic subjects fail Sally-Ann task 




Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990 
  
Autistic subjects only significantly 
different on Sally-Ann task, but not on 
Smarties, Sally-Ann with real people, 
or picture sequencing 
Reed & Peterson, 1990 
  
Autistic subjects fail both ignorance 
and false belief questions on Sally-Ann 
task 
Baron-Cohen, 1991 Autistic subjects show specific deficits 
in understanding only those emotions 
caused by false beliefs 
Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991 Most autistic subjects fail a Sally-Ann 
task; half of those who fail pass 
if question includes "look first" wording 
Leekam & Perner, 1991  Autistic subjects fail Sally-Ann task but 
pass "false" photo task 
Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991 High-functioning autistic subjects are 
impaired on Smarties, mental vs. 
physical, appearance/reality, second order 
false belief, and mental function 
of brain tasks. No worse, however, 
at picture sequencing of intentional stories 
Ozonoff, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991 High-functioning autistic, but not 
Asperger syndrome subjects, show false 
belief impairments 
Roth & Leslie, 1991 Autistic subjects fail to attribute a false 
belief to a hearer given a deceptive 
message 
Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992 Autistic subjects fail Sally-Anne task but 
pass false line drawing task 
Leslie & Thaiss, 1992 Autistic subjects fail Sally-Anne task but 
pass false photo or map task 
Sodian &Frith, 1992 Autistic subjects can sabotage but not 
deceive a competitor and cannot attribute a 
false belief 
Swettenham, 1996 Trained autistic subjects to use strategy of 
visualizing photos in characters' heads to 
predict character's behavior, but no autistic 
subjects could use photo strategy to predict 
a character's mental states 
 




Deception.  Deception is also relevant to understanding other minds, as it 
involved trying to make someone else believe that something is true when it is actually 
false.  Sodian and colleagues (1992) demonstrated that by the age of 4, normally 
developing children show an interest in deception and become more adept instigating it.  
It has been found repeatedly that children with autism show difficulties producing and 
understanding deception. When these children participate in a game with a goal of not 
revealing which hand you have hidden a penny, they often make errors such as hiding the 
penny in one hand, but leaving the other hand open or switching the penny from fist to 
fist mid-game in front of the other person  (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Sodian & Frith, 1992; 
Yirmiya, Solomonica-Levi & Shulman, 1996).  While a lack of deceptive abilities 
reflects a problem understanding others minds, it is not directly related to one’s mental 
processes about themselves. 
Emotion.  Children with autism’s ability to understand belief-based emotions has 
been investigated as well.  It has been found that children with autism can recognize 
simple emotions, but have difficulty recognizing belief based emotions (specifically, the 
emotion of surprise) (Baron-Cohen, Spitz, and Cross, 1993).  Typically developing 3-4 
year olds understand that emotion can be caused by situations and typically developing 4-
6 year olds understand that beliefs can affect emotion (Harris et al 1989). Children with 
autism also understand situations as causes of emotions and can predict a character’s 
emotion on the basis of the character’s desire as well as mentally handicapped children.  
However, children with autism are significantly worse than mentally handicapped and 




typically developing 5 year olds at predicting a character’s emotions on the basis of the 
character’s beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1991). 
 Yet, it is important to note that these tests only measured this ability using 
scenarios in which children with autism had to predict the mental state of a character as 
cause of that character’s emotion.  The currently accepted integrated definition of ToM 
has caused us to accept that these children have a general inability to understand mental 
states as a cause, when their ability to determine if their own mental states can cause their 
own emotions has never been tested. 
Clearly, an abundance of evidence indicates children with autism’s inability to 
correctly understand other’s mental states.  However, previous investigators may have 
incorrectly generalized this inability to represent a complete (social and intrapersonal) 
ToM inability because they have been operating under the integrated ToM assumption.  
The notion that this inability to understand mental states of others may or may not extend 
to a child’s own mental states has scarcely been acknowledged. 
Studies Assessing Children with Autism’s Reasoning About Their Own 
Representations  It is important to note the few studies that have assessed children with 
autism’s ability to understand mental states of self and self compared to others and have 
not found significant differences between the two.  Admittedly, Kazak, Collis, and Lewis 
(1997) asked young people with autism whether they knew or only guessed what was in a 
box having on some trials seen inside.  In a second condition, children were asked if the 
experimenter knew or only guessed what was in the box.  The results showed no 
superiority in judging own knowledge versus judging other’s knowledge.  However, as 




mentioned earlier in regard to the non-autistic population, it certainly seems possible that 
own and other reasoning do not differentiate within the domain of knowledge/belief, but 
do so within other domains and/or other tasks that can be used to measure one’s own 
reasoning.  
Baron-Cohen’s (1989) study also investigated self reasoning.  They used an 
appearance-reality task in which children with autism were shown a misleading object (a 
stone that looked like an egg).  They found that while non-autistic subjects were able to 
correctly answer an appearance question (“What does it really look like?”) and a reality 
question (“What is it really?”), only a small percentage of children with autism were able 
to so do.  This does provide evidence that children with autism have difficulty 
understanding their own mental states, but it does not offer insight about this weakness 
relative to the weakness of understanding others mental states.   
Finally, one additional study did directly test the dissociation between self and 
other reasoning in the autistic population and the results support the differentiated FMS 
Model (Lucariello, 2004).  Leekman and Perner (1991) used a simplified version of the 
Zaitchik (1990) “false photograph” task (which is modeled on the standard false belief 
task except insofar as it tests children’s ability to reason about physical [photographic] 
misrepresentation) with a group of teenagers with high-functioning autism.  One 
condition tested false belief of others.  The second condition tested what they refer to as 
photographic misrepresentations, but can be considered what we term “intrapersonal”, as 
it tapped the participants own beliefs.  




In both conditions, participants were shown a doll (Judy) wearing a red dress. In 
the false belief condition, a second doll (Susan) sees Judy in the red dress and then leaves 
the room.  Judy’s dress is changed from red to green, and subjects are asked “What color 
does Susan think that Judy’s dress is?”.  In the false photograph condition, a Polaroid 
photo is taken of Judy in the red dress.  While the photo is developing, her dress is again 
changed from red to green and participants are asked “In the picture, what color is Judy’s 
dress?”  This question aims to tap into what the subject themselves believe.  Only 25% of 
participants with autism were correct on the false-belief question, but almost all of those 
tested passed the false-photograph question (Leekman & Perner, 1991).  Similar results 
were obtained by Leslie and Thais (1992).    
Results like this strongly suggest that individuals with autism have a specific 
inability to reason about the mental states and processes of others.  However, they are not 
generally impaired in their reasoning abilities about self.  The fact that the abilities differ 
across own and other reasoning garners support for the FMS Model (Lucariello, 2004). 
Asperger Population.  Relatively little research specifically tests the theory of 
mind abilities of children with Asperger syndrome, let alone their specific Social and 
Intrapersonal ToM abilities.  Often these children are included in ToM studies, but are 
folded into samples described as children with autism spectrum disorders (e.g., Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997; Happé, 1994; Baron-Cohen, O'Riordan et al., 1999; Klin, 2000; 
Joliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002). This 
reflects that many researchers do not think of Asperger syndrome as a distinct disorder, 




but a variant of autism, and located on the milder end of the autism spectrum (Bennet et 
al., 2007; Schloper, 1996; Frith, 2004; Macintosh & Dissanayaki, 2004).   
Furthermore, there are inconsistencies in those studies that do separately analyze 
ToM abilities of children with autism and Asperger syndrome.  Some suggest 
deficiencies in ToM abilities are common to both people with autism and Asperger 
syndrome (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Scott, 1985). Others indicate 
that these deficits are less characteristic of Asperger syndrome, and suggest that this may 
be a basis on which the two conditions can be distinguished (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Ziatas, 
Durkin, & Pratt, 1998).   Nonetheless, all of these studies were based on false belief tasks 
and were therefore unable to illuminate potential differences across Social and 
Intrapersonal ToM abilities.   
It is also important to note that studies indicating differences in ToM abilities 
across subjects with autism and Asperger syndrome have often been criticized on the 
grounds that the findings could be attributable to poor subject matching on language 
abilities.   As discussed earlier, there has been strong evidence for a positive correlation 
between verbal skills and theory of mind abilities (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991; Ozonoff et 
al., 1991; Prior et al., 1998). Thus, some argue the apparently better ToM capacity in 
people with Asperger syndrome may just be a reflection their higher verbal abilities 
(Ozonoff & McMahon Griffith, 2000; Volkmar & Klin, 2000; Wing, 1998).   
Clearly, more research is needed to distinguish the ToM skills of children with 
Asperger syndrome and autism.  The verbal abilities need to be controlled and Social and 




Intrapersonal ToM need to be specifically measured to determine if ToM differentiation 
patterns are different between these two groups of children. 
Neuroscientific Support for FMS Model in Children with Autism and Aspergers  
It has been argued that many of the behavioral deficits seen in individuals with 
autism and Asperger syndrome are a result of underlying impairments in neural systems 
involved in self and other representation abilities, and the Mirror Neuron System is now 
thought to mediate this ability.   And, indeed, abnormal MNS activity has been found in 
samples with autism (Oberman et al., 2005; Theoret et al., 2005; Dapretto et al., 2006).  
Often people translate this to mean that children with autism abnormally process self and 
other representations and, therefore, they are related or one and the same.  Yet, this has 
not been tested.  The discovery of the MNS is so recent that its role in the complex ToM 
mentalizing abilities of the autistic population has not yet been directly examined.  
However, the way in which children with autism more basically process own vs. other 
has been explored.  The results suggest that individuals with autism process own and 
other reasoning abnormally, but distinctly, as the FMS Model (Lucariello, 2004) would 
predict.         
The first evidence of MNS impairments in children with autism used recorded mu 
wave suppression, an index of the integrity of the MNS.  Oberman and colleagues (2005) 
reported an absence of mu wave suppression in a sample of 10 individuals with autism 
when they watched videos of another person’s actions. While typically-developing 
individuals showed significant mu wave suppression when they themselves performed a 
hand movement as well as during an observation of someone else performing that action, 




participants with autism only showed mu suppression during the self-performed hand 
movement.  There was no significant change in mu power from a baseline condition 
when the participants with autism were observing.  Therefore, the authors suggest that 
children with autism exhibit dysfunctional mirror neuron systems.  Although one cannot 
directly apply these findings about physical movement to the broader theory of mind 
cognitive ability, they do suggest that differences exist in the ways individuals with 
autism perform things related to self and others, aligning with differentiated framework 
outlined in the FMS Model (Lucariello, 2004). 
Theoret and colleagues (2005) had participants watch videos of finger movements 
that were directed either toward or away from themselves while recording TMS-induced 
motor evoked potentials (MEPs). In typically developing participants, both scenes 
resulted in increased MEPs on their index and thumb muscles.   However, participants 
with autism/Asperger syndrome only showed increased MEPs to actions directed toward 
themselves. The researchers explain these patterns as a function of a mirror neuron deficit 
to a general self-other representation deficit.  But, the fact that the participants with 
autism/Asperger syndrome TMS-induced MEPs differentiated across self directed and 
other directed movement conditions, lends support to the possibility that self and other, 
even if both controlled by the mirror neuron system, may be distinct. 
In one of the best known mirror neuron dysfunction studies, Dapretto and 
colleagues (2006) utilized fMRI and measured the blood oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) signal in regions thought to be part of the MNS while participants with and 
without autism imitated and observed emotional facial expressions. Typically-developing 




children showed activation in a neural network including the mirror propertied pars 
triangularis (Brodmann’s area 45) when imitating facial expressions, but participants with 
autism did not.  Similarly, when the two groups only observed the facial expressions, 
different activation patterns emerged; participants with autism showed less activation in 
the pars triangularis than the typically developing group.  The researchers then went on to 
show that activity in this area was inversely related to autism symptom severity, as 
indexed by the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) and the Autism 
Diagnostic Interview (ADI).   
However, the researchers never directly compared the amount of activation in the 
pars triangularis when participants with autism were observing and imitating.  Imitating 
involves awareness of both self and other, while observing only requires awareness of 
others.  Although not reported, the authors state that when imitating, individuals with 
autism “showed no activity in the mirror area in the pars opercularis” (pg 29).  However, 
when reporting the differences found in the observing condition, they only reported that 
activity in the pars opercularis “was reliably stronger in the typically developing group 
than in the autistic group” (pg 29).  From this, one could imply that the activation 
between the observing and imitation was in fact different (although not reported, so we 
cannot infer statistical significance).  If this is the case, once again, we have reason to 
believe that the cognitive processing of self and others may be different.   
In conclusion, converging evidence suggests that the MNS activity in children 
with autism spectrum disorders is different when processing things related to the self 
compared to others.  Thus far, studies have (only) shown that these children are impaired 




when thinking about others.  However, research on the topic is new and studies 
investigating MNS activity specific to ToM abilities has not yet been conducted.  Yet, the 
evidence that we have thus far suggests that thinking about one’s self and others may be 
cognitively distinct. 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present study was designed to compare the Social and Intrapersonal ToM 
abilities of children with autism and Asperger syndrome.  Previous research specifically 
designed to test differentiation with typically developing samples supports the 
differentiated view of ToM (Lucariello, 2004; Lucariello, et al., 2007; Butler & 
Lucariello, 2006).  Studies investigating the ToM abilities of children with autism and 
Asperger syndrome have nearly exclusively tested only their ability to reason about 
others and, upon finding delay, have generalized that these children are delayed in both 
reasoning about others and self.  Similarly, neuroscientific data on children with autism 
that has classically been used to support an integrated view has only found abnormal 
activity when testing reasoning about others.  Therefore, the differentiated view needs to 
be tested with children with autism and Asperger syndrome to more accurately determine 
the relative ToM strengths and weaknesses of these populations.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Using a quasi-experimental within-subjects design, the current proposal addressed 
the following research questions and hypotheses:   
1. Does Theory of Mind differentiate into Social ToM and Intrapersonal ToM? 




• It is hypothesized that ToM will differentiate into Social ToM and 
Intrapersonal ToM for all participants.  This hypothesis is based on 1) 
previous research in typically developing populations showing ToM 
differentiation, 2) studies with these populations reporting (only) 
impairments in reasoning about others mental states, and 3) 
neuroscientific data that suggesting that ToM may differentiate. 
2. Do children with autism and Asperger syndrome exhibit more severe deficits in 
Social ToM than Intrapersonal ToM? 
• It is hypothesized that both children with autism and Asperger syndrome 
will exhibit more severe deficits in Social ToM than Intrapersonal ToM.  
This hypothesis is based on the fact that both disorders are characterized 
by social interaction impairments, but not necessarily learning 
impairments and the FMS Model proposes that Social ToM is used in 
social interactions and Intrapersonal ToM in learning. 
3. If ToM does differentiate, are the differentiation patterns different for children with 
autism compared to children with Asperger syndrome?  
a. Specifically, is Social ToM more severely impaired in children 
with autism than children with Asperger syndrome? 
• It is hypothesized that children with autism will show 
an even more severe deficit in Social ToM than 
children with Asperger syndrome, as the severity of the 
social interaction impairments are greater in autism and 




the FMS Model proposes that Social ToM is used in 
social interactions. 
b. Is Intrapersonal ToM more severely impaired in children with 
autism than children with Asperger syndrome? 
• No clear hypothesis can be generated since no research 
has been conducted on the Intrapersonal ToM skills of 
children with autism and/or Asperger syndrome.  
Moreover, the proposed functional use of Intrapersonal 








CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
Participants 
Participants included 73 children drawn from 12 schools in the New England 
area.   Thirty-nine of the participants had autism and 34 had Asperger syndrome.  All 
diagnoses were based on the DSM-IV-R criteria and made by clinical psychologists 
and/or psychiatrists. No participants had concurrent DSM-IV-R disorder diagnoses.  The 
full sample included 65 males and 8 females (children with autism: 33 males, 6 females; 
children with Asperger syndrome: 32 males, 2 females.)  These numbers reflect the fact 
that these disorders are much more prevalent in males than females (APA, 2000).  The 
mean chronological age of the full sample was 10.4 years, with a range of 8.04 -13.01 
years (children with autism: 10.3; children with Asperger syndrome: 10.4).  The mean 
mental age of the full sample was 10.4, with a range of 8.0-14.9 (children with autism: 
10.2, children with Asperger syndrome: 10.6).  A prerequisite of a mental age of 8 was 
set as necessary for participation.  (See measures section for a more detailed explanation.) 
Procedure 
Each participant participated in two individual testing sessions.  During the first 
session, the language and IQ measures were administered along with one of the two ToM 
story vignette tasks.  The condition of the story vignette task administered in the first 
session was counterbalanced across participants.  During the second session, the 
remaining battery of ToM tasks was administered.  All sessions took place in a quiet 
space outside of the child’s classroom and lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
Measures 




IQ and Mental Age Measure 
Literature suggests that mainstream intelligence tests do not accurately measure 
the cognitive abilities of children with autism because autistic cognition differs from 
typical human cognition. According to the Association for Psychological Science, a 2007 
study by Dawson and colleagues suggested that Raven's Progressive Matrices (RPM), a 
test of abstract reasoning, may be a better indicator of intelligence for children with 
autism than the more commonly used Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC). 
Neurotypical children scored similarly on both tests, but the children with autism fared 
far better on the RPM than on the WISC.  Researchers suggest that the WISC relies too 
heavily on language to be an accurate measure of intelligence for children with autism.   
Therefore, the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003) was used as 
an IQ and mental age measure for the sample in the current study. 
An IQ cutoff of 70 was established due to the cognitive demands necessary to 
complete the battery of theory of mind tasks proposed.  It is important to note that autism 
is a spectrum disorder and its manifestation varies from individual to individual.  Many 
non-official but widely accepted descriptions of the disorder have emerged: high 
functioning autism (HFA), low functioning autism (LFA), etc.  Although these terms are 
subjective and there are currently no clinical definitions, most researchers agree that it is 
appropriate to refer to someone as having HFA if they meet the criteria for autism and 
have an IQ of 70 or above (Bogdashina, 2006).  This widely accepted guideline was 
applied in the current study and only HFA’s were included to afford sufficient cognitive 
ability to manage the ToM tasks. 




Mental age was calculated based on RPM performance, following guidelines 
presented in the RPM Manuel Research Supplement 3 (Raven, 2000). The mental age 
cutoff of 8 was established to ensure that ToM weaknesses found were not due to general 
developmental immaturity. Metarepresentational ToM is usually attained around the 
mental ages of 4-5 for normally developing children (Astington, Harris, & Olsen, 1988; 
Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983; Gopnick & Astington, 1988; Perner, 1991), but not until 
at least the mental age of 8-9 for children with autism (Happe, 1995).   
Language Measure 
 It was also necessary to determine the language abilities of each participant, as 
there is ample evidence that language and ToM abilities are related (see Language Based 
Accounts section).  Moreover, it has been argued that differences in ToM abilities 
between children with autism and Asperger syndrome may just be a reflection of 
differences in language ability (Ozonoff & McMahon Griffith, 2000; Volkmar & Klin, 
2000; Wing, 1998).  According to Milligan et al.’s (2007) meta-analysis 1) general 
language, 2) semantics, 3) receptive vocabulary, 4) syntax, and 5) memory for 
complements are each related to ToM.   The Test of Language Development Intermediate 
Fourth Edition, TOLD:I-4, (Hammill & Newcomer, 2008) was be given to each 
participant since it measures general language, semantics, receptive vocabulary, and 
syntax.  
Theory of Mind Measure 
The battery of ToM tasks consisted of four metarepresentational reasoning tasks 
that tapped mental state reasoning across the domains of emotions, beliefs, and 




perceptions.  The four tasks were story vignettes, unexpected contents, unexpected 
identity, and color filters.  See Table 2 for the tasks and metarepresentational behaviors 
(social and intrapersonal) they assess.  See Appendix A for a complete procedural script 
for all tasks.  Each of the four tasks tapped both Social and Intrapersonal ToM reasoning, 
which represented separate conditions. A within subject design was employed such that 
each participant received the four tasks in both conditions. Performance across Social and 
Intrapersonal reasoning tasks could be compared.  
Character gender was matched to participant gender.  Order of tasks was 
counterbalanced across participants. 




Table 2  
Tasks and ToM behaviors by mental state assessed 
TASK SOCIAL INTRAPERSONAL 
Story Vignettes: 
Character/child feels 
one emotion but 
depicts another  
 
Appearance-reality emotion  
“How does Diana/David really feel 
when ___? Does D/D feel happy or sad 
or okay?” “How does D/D try to look 
on her/his face? Does s/he look happy 
or sad or okay?” 
 
Appearance-reality emotion 
“How do you really feel when ___? Do 
you feel happy or sad or okay?” “How do 
you try to look on your face? Do you look 





Nice surprise;  
 
INTRAPERSONAL: 
A closed toothpaste 
box is opened to 
reveal M&Ms inside 
 
SOCIAL: 
A band-aid box is 
opened to reveal 
crayons inside 
Representational change emotion  
“When Sally/Sam first saw the box, 
before S/S opened it, how did s/he feel 
about what was inside it? (sad) 
 
Representational change belief 
“When S/S first saw the box, before 
S/S opened it, what did s/he think was 
inside it?” (band-aids) 
 
False belief 
 “If another kid hasn’t seen inside this 
box, when this kid first sees the box, 
before the kid opens it, what will the 
kid think is inside it?” (band-aids) 
 
Representational change emotion 
 “When you first saw the box, before you 
opened it, how did you feel about what 
was inside it?” (sad) 
 
Representational change belief  
“When you first saw the box, before you 
opened it, what did you think was inside 
it?” (toothpaste)  
 
Appearance-reality belief  
“What does it look like is in the box? 




Deceptive object of 
a sponge looking 
like a rock is 
presented to view.  
Then, the child 
touches the object 
and its true identity 
is revealed.  
 
False belief 
“If another kid hasn't touched this and 
hasn’t squeezed it, when this kid first 
sees it, before the kid touches it or 
squeezes it, what will the kid think it 
is?” (rock) 
Representational change belief  
“When you first saw this, before you 
touched it or squeezed it, what did you 
think it was?” (rock)  
 
Appearance-reality belief  
“What does this look like?” (rock) “What 
is this really?” (sponge) 
 
Color Filters: 
Filter placed over 
colored object such 
that only the child 
sees the color 
illusion. 
Appearance (for self) 
“You are looking at the cake with your 
eyes right now. Does it look green to 




“I'm looking at the cake with my eyes 
right now. Does it look green to me or 
does it look purple to me?” (purple) 
 
 
Appearance (for self) 
 “You are looking at the butterfly with 
your eyes right now. Does it look blue to 




 “What color is the butterfly really and 
truly? Is it really and truly blue or is it 
really and truly pink?” (pink) 




Task #1: Story Vignettes 
To assess the ability to distinguish apparent from real emotions, story vignettes 
were administered in which the story character really felt one emotion, but intentionally 
appeared to feel another, different emotion (as done by Gardner et al., 1988; Gross and 
Harris, 1988; Harris et al., 1986).  In the social condition, the character in the vignette 
was another child.  In the intrapersonal condition, the participant was the character in the 
vignette.  
Children were also given a pretest to assess their understanding of the emotions 
used in the task (happy, sad, okay). Children had to correctly link each emotion to 
prototypical situations that elicit that emotion (e.g., birthday would elicit happy; sick 
would elicit sad; nothing special happening would elicit okay).   
Children were also given two memory pretest questions for each story. One 
probed recall of the situation that caused the real emotion. The second probed recall of 
the reason for displaying a different emotion.  All participants correctly answered all 
memory questions. 
Intrapersonal Story (really feel sad; look happy/okay on face) 
1. You go into the dark basement to get a hammer, but you are afraid of the dark. 
You try to hide how you feel so that you will not be a baby. 
Memory Q1: What happens to you when you go to the basement? (afraid of 
dark) 
Memory Q2: What will you be if you show how you feel? (a baby) 
Social Story (really feel sad; look happy/okay on face) 




2. David/Diana goes to the dark basement to get a hammer, but he/she is afraid of 
the dark. David/Diana tries to hide how he/she feel so that he/she will not be a 
baby. 
Memory Q1: What happens to David/Diana when he/she goes to the 
basement? (afraid of dark) 
Memory Q2: What will David/Diana be if he/she shows how he/she feels? 
(a baby) 
The appearance and reality test questions were asked following the memory questions.  
See Table 2. Passing the task was defined as correctly answering both the appearance and 
reality test questions. 
Task #2: Unexpected contents- nice surprise 
Two unexpected content tasks (one in each condition) were used to assess 
representational change in the domains of emotion and belief.  These tasks employ a 
“trick” scenario where a protagonist (social condition) or the child (intrapersonal 
condition) is presented with a container typically associated with “non-fun” (undesired) 
contents (e.g., toothpaste, band-aids).  Upon opening the container, the participant learns 
it actually contains “fun” (desired) contents (e.g., M&M candies, crayons) (e.g., Harris, 
Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989).   
In the social condition, a doll character (Mary/Maxi) was introduced as always 
playing tricks. Then a second doll character (Sally/Sam) was introduced as someone 
whose favorite thing to do is draw with crayons.  Sally/Sam was removed and a band-aid 
box was introduced. The experimenter had Mary/Maxi remove the band-aid, insert 




crayons, and place the box on Sally/Sam's table. Sally/Sam then returned to open the box.  
Test questions assessing representational change (emotion and belief) and false belief 
were administered. See Table 2.  See Appendix A for complete story.   
In the intrapersonal condition, children experience another trick scenario.  The 
experimenter showed the child a toothpaste box that has M&Ms inside (not toothpaste). 
The child was then allowed to look inside.  Test questions assessing representational 
change (emotion and belief) and appearance-reality were administered (both appearance 
and reality test questions had to be correctly answered to receive a passing score).  See 
Table 2 for questions. See Appendix A for complete story. 
In both conditions, a pretest question of “What’s inside the box?” was 
administered after the box had been opened, but prior to administration of test questions, 
to assess that children realize the actual contents of the box.  All children passed the 
pretest. 
Task #3: Unexpected Identity 
The rock-sponge deceptive object method (Flavell et al., 1983; Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988) was used.  In the social condition, false belief was assessed.  In the 
intrapersonal condition, representational change and appearance-reality were assessed 
(for the appearance-reality measure both appearance and reality test questions had to be 
correctly answered to receive a passing score).  All questions were initially asked in an 
open-ended form.  If the child did not provide an answer, the question was re-
administered in a forced-choice format between the two possible answer options.  See 
Table 2. 




A pretest question of “What is this object really?  Is it really a sponge or is it 
really a rock?” was administered after the child touched the object, but before the test 
questions were administered, to assess the child’s knowledge that the object’s actual 
identity was a sponge.  Four children with autism failed this pretest by providing no 
response or an inappropriate response and were excluded from analyses. 
Task #4: Color filters 
This task assessed the mental state domain of perceptions (as developed by 
Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986).  In each condition, the experimenter showed the child 
an object (e.g. a purple cake, but the color was not named).  The experimenter then 
placed the object on the experimenter side of a color filter (e.g., green) such that only the 
child saw the color illusion.  In both conditions, children were first asked an “appearance 
for the self” question.  In the social condition, children were asked a perspective-taking 
question (e.g., what color the object looked like to the experimenter).  In the intrapersonal 
condition, children were asked a reality question (e.g., what color was the object really).  
In both conditions, both questions had to be answered correctly to receive a passing 
score.  See Table 2 for specific questions used in both conditions.   
All participants received a pre-training phase (Flavell, et al., 1986) where the 
experimenter used a sample object and filter to demonstrate the different colors an object 
appeared to the experimenter and child when only the child was looking through a filter. 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 Language and IQ Performance 
Language 
To determine how children performed on the TOLD-I:4, the mean standard 
percentile score was computed for the full sample, children with autism, and children 
with Asperger syndrome.  These data are presented in Table 3.  An independent samples 
t-test showed that children with autism performed significantly lower than children with 
Asperger syndrome, t (71) =-8.502, p<.001.  Due to this group difference, language was 
used as a covariate in many subsequent analyses. 
 
Table 3 
Mean percentile scores on language measure   
 
             
                                                                             Participant Type 
 
                                              All Children                 Autistic                Asperger 
       n=73     n=39        n=34 
     M(SD)  M(SD)      M(SD)  
 
 






To determine how children performed on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices, the 
mean standard percentile score was computed for the full sample, children with autism, 
and children with Asperger syndrome.  These data are presented in Table 4.  An 




independent samples t-test showed no significant difference between children with autism 
and Asperger on this measure. 
 
Table 4 
Mean percentile scores on IQ measure   
 
              
      Participant Type 
 
                                              All Children  Autistic     Asperger 
       n=73     n=39        n=34 
     M(SD)  M(SD)      M(SD)  
 
 




Theory of Mind Performance 
 
Individual Task Performance 
Full Sample 
 
To determine how children performed on the individual ToM tasks, the mean 
proportion of children responding correctly on each task by condition was computed.  
Table 5 shows performance for all children.   
 






Mean proportion of children responding correctly on each task by condition 
 
                    
         Condition 
        Social            Intrapersonal 
Task         n=73                  n=73 
 Test Questions               M (SD)                                   M (SD) 
 
Story Vignettes Task      
Appearance-Reality Emotion  .45 (.50)   .73 (.45) 
 
Unexpected Contents Task      
Representational Change Emotion  .67 (.47)   .89 (.31) 
Representational Change Belief .58 (.50)   .82 (.39) 
False Belief    .55 (.50)    
Appearance-Reality Belief      .78 (.42) 
 
Unexpected Identity Task 
 False Belief    .37 (.49)   
 Representational Change Belief     .85 (.36) 
 Appearance-Reality Belief      .47 (.50) 
 
Color Filters Perception Task    
 Appearance-Reality       .88 (.33) 
 Perspective Taking   .82 (.39) 
 
 





Cronbach alpha scores were computed for all tasks by condition.  These scores 
appear in Table 6.  Performance on the six tasks in the social condition showed strong 
reliability (.641) and performance on the seven tasks in the intrapersonal condition 
showed strong reliability (.698).  In order to determine if tasks that tapped the same 
mental state exhibited strong reliability, tasks were clustered by the mental state they 
tested.  (Note: This could be determined for the mental states of emotion and belief, but 
not for perception, as there was only one perception task in each condition.)  Reliabilities 
for the mental state of emotion were not high.  Reliabilities for the mental state of belief 
were high, with Social tasks exhibiting a reliability of .723 and Intrapersonal tasks a 
reliability of .738.  Tasks were also clustered to determine if any subset of tasks exhibited 
a higher reliability than the aforementioned, but no subset of tasks had a higher reliability 
for both the Social and Intrapersonal conditions than 1) the belief tasks trials or 2) the 




Cronbach alpha scores by condition for tasks (n=73)     
                  
     Condition 
Task         Social (# of trials)      Intrapersonal (# of trials) 
 
Total Task Trials    .641 (6)  .698 (7) 
 
 
Emotion Mental States   .095 (2)  .286 (2) 
Belief Task Trials    .723 (3)      .738 (4) 
 
 




The sample consisted of children with autism (n=39) and children with Asperger 
syndrome (n=34).  Therefore, separate cronbach alpha scores were computed for all tasks 
by condition for these two participant types.  See Table 7 for scores of children with 
autism.  See Table 8 for scores of children with Asperger syndrome.  For children with 
autism, performance on the seven tasks in the intrapersonal condition showed strong 
reliability (.719), but performance on the six tasks in the social condition showed only 
moderate reliability (.522).  The reliabilities for children with Asperger syndrome were 
low at .417 for the performance on the seven tasks in the intrapersonal condition and .439 
for performance on the six tasks in the social condition.   
 
Table 7 
Cronbach alpha scores by condition for tasks for children with autism (n=39) 
     Condition 
Task         Social (# of trials)      Intrapersonal (# of trials) 
 
Total Task Trials    .522 (6)  .719 (7) 
 
 
Emotion Mental States             -.447 (2)  .220 (2) 
Belief Task Trials    .674 (3)      .787 (4) 
________________________________________________________________________






Cronbach alpha scores by condition for tasks for children with Asperger (n=34) 
 
                      Condition 
Task         Social (# of trials)      Intrapersonal (# of trials) 
 
Total Task Trials    .439 (6)  .417 (7) 
 
 
Emotion Mental States   .067 (2)            -.100 (2) 
Belief Task Trials    .521 (3)      .560 (4) 
________________________________________________________________________





To determine if success on each individual test question was significantly 
different for children with autism and Asperger syndrome, a 2 x 13 Repeated Measures 
ANCOVA was run, with participant type (autism, Asperger) as the between subjects 
factor, the thirteen items as the within subjects factor, and language as the covariate.   See 
Table 9 for the mean proportion of children with autism and Asperger syndrome that 
responded correctly on each social and intrapersonal test question. 
Significant differences between groups were found on only two test questions.  
Both test questions were intrapersonal appearance-reality questions.  Children with 
Asperger syndrome were more successful than those with autism on the Intrapersonal 
Story Vignettes Appearance-Reality Emotion test question, F(1,72)=5.255, p <.05, and 
the Intrapersonal Unexpected Identity Appearance-Reality Belief test question, 
F(1,72)=6.656, p <.05.  




Table 9  
Mean proportion of children with autism and Asperger syndrome responding correctly 
on each test question 
 
            Participant Type 
       Autism   Asperger  
   Task        n=39     n=34  
 Test Question                M (SD)             M (SD) 
Social Theory of Mind Test Questions    
   Story Vignettes Task       
Appearance-Reality Emotion  .33 (.48) .59 (.50) 
    
   Unexpected Contents Task      
 Representational Change Emotion  .44 (.50) .94 (.24) 
 Representational Change Belief .36 (.49) .82 (.39) 
 False Belief    .33 (.48) .79 (.41)    
 
   Unexpected Identity Task 
 False Belief    .21 (.41) .56 (.50)    
 
   Color Filters Perception Task    
 Perspective Taking Perception .85 (.37) .79 (.41)  
 
Intrapersonal Theory of Mind Test Questions  
   Story Vignettes Task      
 Appearance-Reality Emotion  .56 (.50) .91 (.29)*   
 
   Unexpected Contents Task      
 Representational Change Emotion  .82 (.39) .97 (.17)  
 Representational Change Belief .74 (.44) .91 (.29)    
 Appearance-Reality Belief  .69 (.47) .88 (.33)    
 
   Unexpected Identity Task      
 Representational Change Belief .79 (.41) .91 (.29)   
 Appearance-Reality Belief  .41 (.50) .53 (.51)*    
 
   Color Filters Perception Task    
 Appearance-Reality Perception .82 (.39) .94 (.24)    
 
*p < .05 





Composite Theory of Mind Performance 
 
As discussed earlier, strong reliabilities were found on the six Social ToM tasks 
and seven Intrapersonal ToM tasks for the full sample.  Therefore, all thirteen tasks were 
used to compute composite ToM scores for each participant.   
Total ToM 
The composite ‘Total ToM’ score was the proportion of correct responses on all 
13 tasks, calculated by tallying the number of tasks passed over the total number of tasks 





Mean composite ToM scores by group 
 
                        Participant Group 
        Full Sample   Autistic Asperger 
            n=73      n=39                n=34 
Composite Measure         M (SD)          M (SD)            M (SD) 
 
 
Total ToM     .68 (.23) .56 (.23) .81 (.14) 
 
Social ToM     .57 (.28) .42 (.25) .75 (.21) 
 




  The mean Total ToM score for the full sample of participants was .68 (SD=.23). 
Group Differences 




A univariate ANCOVA was run on Composite Total ToM scores by group 
(autism, Aspgerger) with language as the covarite.  No significant difference was found.   
Social ToM vs. Intrapersonal ToM 
The six social tasks were used to compute a composite ‘Social ToM’ score for 
each participant, as the reliability of these six tasks was high (.641) and measured a 
variety of mental states (emotions, beliefs, and perception).  These scores were the 
proportion of correct responses on the six social tasks, calculated by tallying the number 
of social tasks passed over the total number of social tasks (six).  See Table 10 for means. 
Similarly, the seven intrapersonal tasks were used to compute a composite 
‘Intrapersonal ToM’ score, as the reliability of these seven tasks was high (.698) and 
measured a variety of mental states (emotions, beliefs, and perception).  These scores 
were the proportion of correct responses on the seven intrapersonal tasks, calculated by 
tallying the number of intrapersonal tasks passed over the total number of intrapersonal 
task taken (seven).  See Table 10 for means. 
Full Sample 
To determine if the composite Social ToM scores and Intrapersonal ToM scores 
were significantly different after controlling for language, a Repeated Measures 
ANCOVA was run with ToM Type (Social ToM, Intrapersonal ToM) as the within 
subjects factor and language as the covariate.  A significant difference was found 
between the two composite scores, with children having a lower Social ToM score than 
Intrapersonal ToM score, F (1, 72)=34.634, p<.01.  See Figure 1.  
 



















































To determine if Social ToM and Intrapersonal ToM scores varied as a function of 
participant group, a 2 x 2 Repeated Measures ANCOVA was run with ToM type (Social 
ToM, Intrapersonal ToM) as the within subjects factor, participant group (autism, 
Asperger) as the between subjects factor, and language as the covariate.  Post hoc 
analyses were conducted to better understand the significant differences. 
Consistent with the Repeated Measures ANCOVA run on the full sample 
discussed earlier, the test revealed a significant main effect of ToM type, with children 
having higher Intrapersonal ToM scores (M=.77, SD=.24) than Social ToM scores 
(M=.57, SD=.28), F (1,72) = 10.031, p<.05.  No significant main effect of participant 
type was found, F (1,72) = 1.486, p=.227.  However, a significant interaction between 
participant type and ToM type was found, F (1,72) = 5.934, p<.05.  The difference 
between Social ToM and Intrapersonal ToM scores was greater for children with autism 
than children with Asperger syndrome (p<.01) Post hoc analyses also revealed a 
significant difference between Social ToM scores for children with autism and Asperger 
syndrome, with children with Asperger syndrome having a higher Social ToM scores 
than children with autism (p<.05).  No significant difference was found between the 
groups Intrapersonal ToM scores.  See Figure 2.   
 





Mean proportion correct on Social ToM and Intrapersonal ToM for children with autism 
















































Contributions of Language and IQ 
To determine the relationship between language ability and IQ on ToM 
performance, Pearson’s correlations were run between the Total ToM, Social ToM, 
Intrapersonal ToM scores and the children’s percentile scores on the TOLD-I:4 language 
measure and percentile scores on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices IQ measure.  Indeed, 
both language and IQ were strongly related to Total ToM, Social ToM, and Intrapersonal 
ToM performance.  See Table 11 for correlations. 
 
Table 11 
Pearson’s correlations for Total ToM scores, language, and IQ  
 
   
         Language  IQ 
 
 
Total ToM     .659***  .595*** 
 
Total Social ToM    .619***  .539*** 
 
Total Intrapersonal ToM   .550***  .517*** 
 
 
***p < .001 
 
 
To investigate the contribution of language and IQ on ToM performance, a series 
of stepwise linear regressions was conducted. To determine if these regressions should be 
run on the full sample or separately for children with autism and Asperger syndrome, 
linear regressions were run with participant type, language percentile score (mean 




centered), and the interaction of participant type and language percentile score (mean 
centered) as predictors for Total ToM, Social ToM, and Intrapersonal ToM.  Similarly, 
linear regressions were run with participant type, IQ percentile score (mean centered), 
and the interaction of participant type and IQ percentile score (mean centered) as 
predictors for Total ToM, Social ToM, and Intrapersonal ToM.   The interaction terms 
were not significant in any of these models, suggesting that the relationships between 
language and IQ on ToMs were not different for children with autism and Asperger 
syndrome.  Therefore, the following stepwise linear regressions were conducted on the 
full sample. 
Total ToM Scores 
To determine the contribution of language and IQ to theory of mind abilities, a 
stepwise linear regression was conducted with Total ToM as the dependent variable.  
Language percentile score was entered in the first step and IQ percentile score was 
entered as a second step.  Language accounted for 45% of the variance in Total ToM 
scores, F(1, 72)=58.49, p<.001.  IQ accounted for an additional 11% of the variance in 
Total ToM scores, F(1, 72)=16.73, p<.001.  See Table 12.  




Table 12  
Regression of Total ToM on language and IQ  
 
Variable          Change in R2   B(SE)    β  R2  
     
 
Step 1    
    Languagea  .452*** .009 (.001) .607*** .452 
Step 2      
    IQb   .106*** .015 (.004) .332*** .557 
 
 
Note: Betas are for the finals step in the model. 
***p <.001 
aTOLD:I-4 Mean Percentiles 
bRaven Progressive Matrices Mean Percentiles 
 
 
Social ToM Scores 
A stepwise linear regression was conducted for the full sample with Social ToM 
as the dependent variable.  Language percentile score was entered in the first step.  IQ 
percentile score was entered as a second step.  Language accounted for 39% of the 
variance in Social ToM scores, F(1, 72)=44.40, p<.001.  IQ accounted for an additional 
5% of the variance in Social ToM scores, F(1, 72)=6.55, p<.05.  See Table 13.  
 






Regression of Social ToM on language and IQ  
 
 
Variable           Change in R2   B(SE)    β  R2  
     
 
Step 1    
  Languagea  .385*** .010(.002) .574*** .385 
Step 2      
IQb   .053*  .013(.005) .234*  .437 
 
Note: Betas are for the finals step in the model. 
***p <.001 
*p<.05 
aTOLD:I-4 Mean Percentiles 
bRaven Progressive Matrices Mean Percentiles 
 
Intrapersonal ToM Scores 
Finally, a stepwise linear regression was conducted for the full sample with 
Intrapersonal ToM as the dependent variable.  Language percentile score was entered in 
the first step.  IQ percentile score was entered as a second step.  Language accounted for 
33% of the variance in Intrapersonal ToM scores, F(1, 72)=34.56, p<.001.  IQ accounted 
for an additional 12% of the variance in Intrapersonal ToM scores, F(1, 72)=15.52, 
p<.001.  See Table 14.  




Table 14  
 
Regression of Intrapersonal ToM on language and IQ  
 
 
Variable           Change in R2   B(SE)    β  R2  
     
 
Step 1    
    Languagea  .327*** .008(.001) .502*** .327 
Step 2      
    IQb   .122*** .017(.004) .356*** .449 
 
Note: Betas are for the finals step in the model. 
***p <.001 
aTOLD:I-4 Mean Percentiles 














CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
Three major issues related to ToM abilities in children with autism and Asperger 
syndrome were addressed.  One was the relation between language and ToM ability.  The 
second was whether ToM is a non-integrated cognitive skill that differentiates into Social 
and Intrapersonal ToMs, as proposed in the Functional Multilinear Socialization Model 
(Lucariello 2004).  The third issue examined was whether ToM abilities were different 
for children with autism and Asperger syndrome.  
Language and Theory of Mind 
Language was highly correlated and contributed to ToM performance.  In fact, 
language contributed to performance on Total ToM, Social ToM, and Intrapersonal ToM.  
These findings are consistent with the large body of literature documenting the 
relationship between ToM and language in typically developing children (Astington & 
Jenkins, 1999; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Ruffman, et al., 2003) 
children with autism (Happe, 1995; Tager-Flusberg & Joseph, 2005), and children with 
Asperger syndrome (Bennett, 2007; Stein et al., 2004; Klin et al., 2005).  In fact, the 
language measure used in the current study was specifically selected because it measured 
general language, semantics, syntax, and vocabulary, all of which were found to be 
related to Theory of Mind performance in Milligan and colleagues (2007) meta-analysis.   
The current study contributes to the preexisting literature by suggesting that the 
relationship between language and ToM may be different based on function.  Previous 
work investigating the relationship between language and ToM has been limited by 
relying nearly exclusively on performance on false belief tasks as the 




metarepresentational ToM measure (see Milligan et al., 2007).  By investigating ToM as 
a differentiated cognitive skill, the current study was able to show that language was 
more strongly related to Social ToM than Intrapersonal ToM.  Lucariello, Butler, and 
Yarnell (2009) also investigated this possibility and found similar results; language 
accounted for more variance in ToM tasks that were social in nature than those that were 
object-oriented.   
Theory of Mind Differentiation 
Findings showed that ToM differentiated.  For both groups of children, 
Intrapersonal ToM functioning was stronger than Social ToM performance.  Social ToM 
performance was not strong, with correct performance at 57%.  This makes sense when 
considering the functional uses of Social and Intrapersonal ToM and the known 
impairments in autism and Asperger syndrome.  The Functional Multilinear Socialization 
Model (Lucariello, 2004) proposes that Social ToM is primarily used for social 
interaction and learning about persons (Lucariello, 2006). Children with autism and 
Asperger syndrome, by definition, have impaired social interactions (DSM-IV-R, 2000).  
Therefore, it is not surprising that they showed relatively poor Social ToM skills.   
On the other hand, Intrapersonal ToM is primarily used for learning (Lucariello, 
2004; Lucariello et al., 2006).  While it is true that many children with autism exhibit 
some learning difficulties, learning difficulties do not constitute a diagnostic criterion of 
autism.  In fact, many children with autism do not exhibit learning difficulties.   It has 
been widely reported that seventy-five percent of children with autism have mental 
retardation (Roeleveld, et al, 1997). However, that estimate was based on clinic 




populations and did not include the full range of autism spectrum.  A more recent study 
found that only thirty-five percent of children with autism have mental retardation (Baird, 
et al, 2000).  Moreover, individuals with Asperger syndrome cannot possess a ‘clinically 
significant’ cognitive delay by definition (DSM-IV-R, 2000).  Therefore, the fact that the 
full sample in the current study showed stronger Intrapersonal ToM skills is not 
surprising, as Intrapersonal ToM is proposed to be used in learning and learning is not 
necessarily a cognitive weakness for these children.   
It is important to note that the finding that ToM differentiates runs counter to the 
assumption that it is an integrated cognitive ability. The integrated view is told by every 
mature account of ToM including the modularity view (German & Leslie, 2000, 2001; 
Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Scholl & Leslie, 1999, 2000), theory-
theory view (Gopnik, 1993, Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Perner, 1991; Wellman & Cross, 
2001), sociocultural (Dunn et al., 1991; Hughes & Dunn, 1998; Perner et al., 1994; 
Ruffman et al., 1998), and language based accounts (Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Hughes 
& Dunn, 1998; Jenkins & Astington, 1996; Ruffman et. al., 2003).  
The main evidence for the integrated view is the meta-analysis by Wellman and 
colleagues (2001).  However, as noted earlier, this meta-analysis was limited to studies 
assessing false belief.  The current study defined ToM more broadly and measured tasks 
that tapped emotional, perceptual, and belief mental states.  Use of this broader definition 
allowed the differentiation of ToM to be revealed.  
The differentiation of ToM into Social and Intrapersonal ToM lends support to the 
Functional Socialization Model (Lucariello, 2004).  The current findings add to a 




growing body of evidence suggesting that Social and Intrapersonal ToM are in fact 
distinct cognitive abilities.  As discussed earlier, Social and Intrapersonal ToM was found 
to be differentiated in low- and middle-income 5-6 year olds (Lucariello, 2004; 
Lucariello et al., 2007).  Theory of Mind has also been found to be differentiated in low- 
and middle-income third-graders (Lucariello et al., 2009).   
In all of the aforementioned cases, children exhibited greater strength in Social 
ToM than Intrapersonal ToM.  However, differentiation and asymmetric functioning has 
been shown in the other direction, as well.  Butler and Lucariello (2006) found that gifted 
children exhibited uneven ToM development.  As with the current sample, the gifted 
children performed better on Intrapersonal ToM tasks than Social ToM tasks.  Not only 
does ToM differentiate into Social and Intrapersonal forms, but asymmetry in the 
development of the forms can occur in either direction based on which uses are recruited 
more heavily in development. 
 The Functional Multilinear Socialization Model is the only ToM theory that can 
account for asymmetric ToM development in either direction.  Harris’s (2004) simulation 
theory does predict uneven development across Social and Intrapersonal ToM.  However, 
according to simulation theory, Intrapersonal ToM is primary and Social ToM secondary 
or subsequent.  
ToM Differentiation by Group 
An additional goal of this research was to determine if ToM skills were different 
for children with autism and Asperger syndrome.  While both groups exhibited weaker 




Social ToM than Intrapersonal ToM, this asymmetry was greater for children with 
autism, whose Social ToM function was especially weak (42% correct response rate). 
This finding makes sense when considering that Social ToM is proposed to play a 
role in social interactions and social interactions are more severely impaired in autism 
than Asperger syndrome.  Hence, Social ToM development is vulnerable in children with 
autism because it is not heavily recruited or exercised. Children with autism tend not to 
initiate or engage in much social interaction. In contrast, individuals with Asperger 
syndrome approach others, albeit in an inappropriate or eccentric fashion (Aarons & 
Gittens, 1993).  They often express interest in friendships and in meeting people (Klin, 
2006). In the words of the Autism Society of America (2008), “Children with autism are 
frequently seen as aloof and uninterested in others.  This is not the case with Asperger 
syndrome.  Individuals with Asperger syndrome usually want to fit in and have 
interaction with others; they simply don’t know how to do it.”  In addition, differences 
exist in the number of social impairment symptoms seen between groups.  Children with 
Asperger syndrome exhibit fewer social impairment symptoms than children with autism 
(Bogdashina, 2006).  Finally, children with autism score lower than those with Asperger 
syndrome on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale, which assesses adaptive behavior in 
socialization (Szatmari, 2000).   
 There was no difference in Intrapersonal ToM abilities across the two groups.   
Intrapersonal ToM is thought to be used in learning (Lucariello, 2004).  The fact that 
learning difficulties are not a diagnostic criterion for either disorder has already been 
discussed.  It is possible that participants in both groups did not have learning difficulties. 




Indeed, the IQ measure used in this study indicated that both groups IQ scores fell within 
the normal range.  Moreover, the IQ scores of children with autism and Asperger 
syndrome were not statistically different, again suggesting that learning potential was the 
same across groups. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 A few limitations of the present research should be noted.  Although the sample 
included a range of chronological and mental ages, there was not enough variation to be 
able to determine a developmental trajectory of Intrapersonal and Social ToM.  For 
example, it might be possible that Social ToM improves with age.  Research on the 
relationship between ToM performance and age in these populations is inconsistent. 
Some have found no relation between the two (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985; Perner et al, 
1981).  Yet, others have found that older autistic children are more likely to pass ToM 
tasks than younger children.  For example, in Baron-Cohen’s (1992) study, the four 
autistic participants who passed the false belief tasks were all older than 9.9, and three of 
the four were older than 15.  He concluded that a relatively high age was necessary but 
not sufficient for subjects with autism to pass the Smarties task.  A few studies have 
assessed the actual development of ToM in these populations.  Ozonoff & McEvoy 
(1994) investigated whether ToM abilities changed over a 3-year period and found no 
improvement.  Similarly, another study found ToM skills showed no improvement over a 
7-year time period (Holroyd & Baron-Cohen, 1993).  In contrast, Serra and colleagues 
(2002) found that both typically developing children and children with Asperger 
syndrome showed an increase in ToM scores between the ages of 3-5.  However, the 




increase for the typically developing children was considerably greater, took place over a 
shorter period of time, and showed a different qualitative pattern of change than seen in 
the children with autism and Asperger syndrome.  Unfortunately, the current study was 
unable to determine ToM growth patterns due to the limited variation in age of the 
sample.  It will be essential to determine the developmental trajectory now that it has 
been documented that ToM differentiates. It is possible that the development of Social 
and Intrapersonal ToM follows different paths for different groups of children.  
Moreover, developmental differences between Social and Intrapersonal ToM may help 
clarify current inconsistencies documented in the literature.   
 A second limitation of the current study is that no information was obtained 
regarding the amount and type of therapy or intervention participants received prior to 
participation.  To address the consistently documented finding that these children face 
ToM difficulties, various training programs have been developed in recent years.  For 
example, Howlin, Baron-Cohen, and Hadwin (1999) developed an intervention guide 
entitled ‘Teaching Children with Autism to Mind-Read: A Practical Guide’ that provides 
information on how to teach ToM skills.  A variety of others books and resources are 
available to help individuals with autism and Asperger syndrome develop ToM 
understanding (Gray, 2000; McAfee, 2001; Fahety, 2000).  It is possible that these 
resources were utilized more by one group than the other.  If this was the case, it is 
possible that the differences found in ToM skills may have been a result of intervention 
practices as opposed to the disorders themselves.  




 The current study suggests that ToM is differentiated, but does not specifically 
address whether its emergence is domain-general or domain-specific.  In order to 
hypothesize about domain specificity it is important to first consider the contexts in 
which ToM operates.  ToM is used in social contexts; social interactions clearly entail 
Social ToM and Intrapersonal ToM can be used for social-interactive ends (e.g. when one 
considers their own false beliefs about others).  There are also non-social contexts that 
require ToM reasoning, such as when it is applied to the physical, object world.  Both 
Social and Intrapersonal ToM operate in these non-social contexts, as well.  Social ToM 
is engaged when children consider another persons reasoning about an object.  
Intrapersonal ToM is engaged when processing the object world and generating multiple 
representations of an object.   
Therefore, it is important to consider if ToM emerges across these social and non-
social contexts (meaning its development is domain-general) or originates in just one 
context (meaning its development is domain specific).  Lucariello, Butler, and Yarnell 
(2009) specifically explored the question of domain specificity by studying ToM across 
social and object task contexts.  Both Social and Intrapersonal ToM functioning were 
stronger on social tasks than object tasks, suggesting ToM emergence is domain specific 
and social contexts are the ground for its emergence.  However, it is important to note 
that these data were collected from a sample of neurotypical third grade students. 
It would be interesting to explore ToM domain specificity in children with autism and 
Asperger syndrome.  It seems possible that for these children ToM emergence is domain 
specific, but that emergence begins within non-social contexts.  These children exhibit 




extreme focus and obsession regarding objects (APA, 2000). Swettenham and colleagues 
(1998) compared the amount of attention directed towards objects and people in typically 
developing infants, infants with autism, and infants with developmental disorders.  
While, infants with autism showed a shorter mean duration of look at people than the 
other two groups, they showed a longer duration of look at objects.  In addition, Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright (1999) found that the obsessions of children with autism and 
Asperger syndrome occurred more often in the domain of ‘folk physics’ (defined as an 
interest in how objects work) and less often in the domain of “folk psychology (an 
interest in how people work).  It would be interesting to see if metarepresentational ToM 
originates in non-social domains for these children, which would contrast the 
considerable evidence that it develops in social contexts for typically developing children 
(Carpendale & Lewis, 2006). 
Implications 
 The finding that ToM differentiates into Social and Intrapersonal ToM has 
important research and clinical implications.  First, the field of psychology needs to 
reconsider how ToM is defined.  This study contributes to a growing body of evidence 
showing that ToM is not a single integrated cognitive ability, but rather a differentiated 
set of abilities.  The Functional Multilinear Socialization Model (Lucariello, 2004) is the 
only ToM theory that accounts for this differentiation and variable asymmetric 
development and should therefore be used as the primary conceptual model moving 
forward.    




 The current study also provides a more thorough understanding of autism and 
Asperger syndrome.  There has been much debate as to the relationship between the two.  
The DSM-IV-R and ICD-10 imply that they are separate disorders although both state 
that the diagnostic validity of the distinction is uncertain.  Others believe that Asperger 
syndrome is in fact at one end of the autism spectrum, with autism at the other end 
(Bennet et al., 2007).  Yet, some believe that there is no difference between the clinical 
presentations and that it is not useful to employ the diagnostic labels at all (Scholper, 
1996).  Literature reviews have highlighted the gaps in research addressing the issue of 
distinctiveness (or lack thereof) of the diagnoses.  These reviews concluded that it is too 
early to conclude whether the disorders are the same or different (Frith, 2004; Macintosh 
& Dissanayake, 2004). 
The current findings support the idea that Asperger syndrome and autism should 
be considered separate disorders.  Both groups exhibited weaker Social ToM than 
Intrapersonal ToM.  However, the children with autism exhibited a more severe Social 
ToM impairment than children with Asperger syndrome.  This finding suggests that there 
is something unique about autism: a more severe Social ToM deficit.  This new 
understanding of the autism–Asperger distinction allows us to better understand these 
children.  A better understanding can lead to better specified intervention programs, 
which can in turn help these children cope with their condition and achieve their full 
potential. 
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Script for Task Administration 







Child Name:  ______________________________ 
 
Gender:  ______________________________ 
 
School:  ______________________________ 
 
Classroom:  ______________________________ 
 
Date Tested:  ______________________________ 
 









We are going to play some games today. Would you like to play? (Verbal Consent) 
 
<OTHER Pre-test for Story Vignettes> 
“This is the face of Diana/David when she is happy, sad and not sad and not happy 
but just OK.” 
“Can you point to Diana/David’s face on her birthday?” 
“Can you point to Diana/David’s face when she is sick?” 
“Can you point to Diana/David’s face when there’s nothing special happening, 
nothing bad and nothing good?” 
 
Following this pre-training in the meaning of the 3 verbal expressions-happy, sad, and 
OK-the drawings are removed.  
 
TASK series-“reality” Q first  
Before reading stories, say introductory remarks/preamble: 
“Now I’m going to tell you some stories of things that could happen to Diana/David. 
After the story, I am going to ask you about what happened in the story then, I’m 
going to ask you about how Diana/David really feels inside and how s/he looks on 
her/his face. S/he might really feel one way inside but look a different way on her/his 
face.” 




<OWN Pre-test for Story Vignettes> 
(Display the three faces first and then label each of them, Start with happy → sad → ok) 
“Let’s say this is your face when you are happy, sad and not sad and not happy but 
just OK.” 
“Can you point to your face on your birthday?” 
“Can you point to your face when you are sick?” 
“Can you point to your face when there’s nothing special happening, nothing bad 
and nothing good?” 
 
Following this pre-training in the meaning of the 3 verbal expressions-happy, sad, and 
OK-the drawings are removed.  
 
 
TASK series-“reality” Q first  
Before reading stories, say introductory remarks/preamble: 
“Now I’m going to tell you some stories of things that could happen to you. After the 
story, I am going to ask you about what happened in the story then, I’m going to ask 
you about how you look on your face and how you really feel inside. You might 
really feel one way inside but look a different way on your face.  




[Vignette 1: Hammer-OTHER] Diana/David goes to the dark basement to get a 
hammer, but she/he is afraid of the dark. Diana tries to hide how she feels so that 
she will not be a baby. I’m going to ask you some questions. 
 
Memory Q1 




What will Diana/David be like if she shows how she feels? (answer- a baby) 
 
 
If children fail to answer one of both Qs correctly, the story needs to be re-read and the 
Q(s) not answered correctly should be repeated. Children who answer both correctly are 
included in analyses. 
 
 
REALITY: How does Diana really feel when she goes to the basement? Does she feel 







APPEARANCE: How does Diana try to look on her face when she goes to the 










[Vignette 2: Hammer -OWN] You go to the dark basement to get a hammer, but you 
are afraid of the dark. You try to hide how you feel so that you will not be a baby.  
 
 
Memory Q1  




What will you be like if you show how you feel? (answer- a baby) 
 
 
If children fail to answer one of both Qs correctly, the story need to be re-read and the 
Q(s) not answered correctly should be repeated. Children who answer both correctly are 




REALITY: How do you really feel when you go to the basement? Do you feel okay or 







APPEARANCE: How do you try to look on your face when you go to the basement? 
Do you look okay or happy or sad? (anwser-happy or okay) 
 
 





Unexpected Identity Task: PRE-TEST 
Take a look at this. (Give a few seconds just to look at the object) Okay now you can 
pick it up. Squeeze it.  
 
Pre-test Q1: What is it? Presumably, the child answers that it is a sponge. 
 
If they do not respond with the label “sponge” to the initial “What is it?” question, they 
are asked a second question. 
 
Q2: What else is it? 
If this fails to elicit the “sponge” response, they are asked a 3rd and final question 
 
Q3: Is it like anything you have seen or used before? 
If they respond in the affirmative, they are asked the follow-up question 
 
 
Q4. Oh, then what is it like? 
Whatever word/phrase the child comes-up with (if not “sponge”), use in questions.  
 
Okay, now put it back on the table (desk).1 
(Child can hold the object during the pretest.)  
                                                 
1
 The objective is returned to its previous deceptive state after pretest (Gopnik & Astington, 1988, p.29) 




Unexpected Identity: APPEARANCE-REALITY (OWN) 
 
APPEARANCE: What does this look like? (answer – rock) 
If children do not respond, Forced-choice Q: Does it look like a rock or does it look like a 
sponge (use the words the child comes-up with)? 
 
REALITY: What is this really? (answer – sponge)  
Forced-choice Q: Is it really a rock or is it really a sponge?  




Unexpected Identity: REPRESENTATIONAL CHANGE (OWN) 
 
REPRESENTATIONAL CHANGE Q (Slowly read) : When you first saw this, before 
you touched it or squeezed it, what did you think it was? (answer – rock) 
forced-choice Q: Did you think it was a sponge or did you think it was a rock? 




Unexpected Identity: FALSE-BELIEF (Other) (Slowly read) 
If another kid hasn’t touched this and hasn’t squeezed it, when this kid first sees it, 
before the kid touches it or squeezes it, what will the kid think it is? (answer – rock) 
 
forced-choice Q: 
Will he/she think it’s a sponge or will he/she think it’s a rock? 
 




Unexpected Content Task: Toothpaste- OWN [the 3 questions should be 
counterbalanced] 
 
Would you rather have M&Ms or toothpaste as snack? (Give some time) 
I have something to give you.  
Open it up 
 
 (One pack of M&Ms in the toothpaste box) 
 
PRETEST Q: What’s inside the box? Answer (M&Ms) 
 
After pretest, the object returns to its previous deceptive state2– “Give them back to 
me.” (E put M&Ms back in the box, closes the box and places it on the table between 
Child and E) 
 
REPRESENTATIONAL CHANGE EMOTION: 
When you first saw the box, before you opened it, how did you feel about what was 
inside it? (Ans: sad, disappointed, not happy...) 
 
Forced Q: Did you feel happy about what was inside it or did you feel sad about what 
was inside it? 
 
(OWN) REPRESENTATIONAL CHANGE BELIEF:  
When you first saw the box, before you opened it, what did you think was inside it? 
(ans-toothpaste) 
 
If children do not respond, then administer forced-choice Q: Did you think there were 
M&Ms inside it or did you think there was a toothpaste inside it? (answer-toothpaste) 
 
 
Unexpected Content Task: APPEARANCE-REALITY  
 
APPEARANCE: What does it look like is in the box? (answer-toothpaste) 
 
 
forced-choice Q: Does it look like there is toothpaste inside or does it look like there are 




REALITY: What’s really in the box? (answer:  M&Ms) 
 
                                                 
2
 The box is closed after pre-test (Hogrefe et al., 1986; Gopnik & Astington, 1988). 




forced-choice Q: Is there really toothpaste inside it or are there really M&Ms inside it? 




Unexpected Content Task: Crayon in Bandaid box- OTHER [Should be counterbalanced] 
 
3 Bandaids/ 3 crayons/ One Bandaid box needed for this task 
Girl characters for girls. Boy characters for boys.  
 
This is Mary/Maxi and s/he is always playing tricks on the other kids. This is 
Sally/Sam and her favorite thing to do is drawing with crayons.  
 
Mary/Maxi is going to play a trick on Sally/Sam (while Sally/Sam goes outside). 
Let’s see what Mary does. (Sally/Sam is hiding under the E’s table. Mary/Maxi opens 
the Baindaid box and takes out Bandaid and put three crayons.)  
 
Mary/Maxi put the Bandaid box with the crayons inside it on the table.  
Sally/Sam came and saw this Bandaid box on the table.  
(Sally/Sam was then brought toward the box and placed beside it and opens the box.)  
 
 
PRETEST Q: What’s inside the box? Answer (Crayons) 
 
Experimenter puts the crayons in the Bandaid box, closes it and asks questions.  
 
 
REPRESENTATIONAL CHANGE EMOTION:  
When Sally/Sam first saw the box, before she/he opened it, how did she/he feel about 
what was inside it? (Ans: sad) 
 
Forced q: Did Sally/Sam feel happy about what was inside it or did Sally/Sam feel sad 
about what was inside it? 
 
FALSE BELIEF: 
If another kid hasn’t seen inside this box, when the kid first sees the box, before the 
kid opens it, what will the kid think is inside it? Answer (Bandaid) 
 
forced-choice Q: 




REPRESENTATIONAL CHANGE BELIEF:  
When Sally/Sam first saw the box, before s/he opened it, what did she/he think was 
inside it? (Ans: Bandaids) 
 
If children do not respond, then administer forced-choice Q: Did Sally/Sam think there 
were Bandaids inside it or did Sally/Sam think there was crayons inside it? 





Color Filters  
Color Pretest-Children are pre-tested for their ability to name or point or given the name, 
all colors used in the study.  
 
PRETRAINING : Experimenter shows the child a cut-out of a white fish and says 
“Here’s a white fish,” places it on the table on Experimenter side of a vertical green filter 
and says “The fish looks green to you because you’re looking through this thing (points 
to filter). I’m looking at the fish too, but it looks white to me. Now (places fish on the 
child’s side of the filter) and says “The fish looks white to your eyes and green to mine.” 
 
General Method –Experimenter shows child the object (but does not name its color), 
places it on Experimenter’s side of the illusion-giving device (so child and NOT 













Pink Butterfly with Blue Filter (Own) 
<The following questions should be counterbalanced> 
 
APPEARANCE (Own): 
Here’s the (first) question. You are looking at the butterfly with your eyes right 




Here’s the (second) question. What color is the butterfly really and truly? Is it really 
and truly blue or is it really and truly pink? (Pink) 
 
 





Purple Cake with Green Filter (Own, Other) 
<The following questions should be counterbalanced> 
 
APPEARANCE (Own): 
Here’s the (first) question. You are looking at the cake with your eyes right now. 





Here’s the (second) question. I’m looking at the cake with my eyes right now. Does it 

























< Thanks so much for playing with me.  I’m going to play with other children. So 
don’t tell any of the other kids about any of the games that we played, ok? > 
